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Abstract 
This thesis examines the financing and construction arrangements of the recently 
designed Airport Link project in Brisbane, Australia.  The central hypothesis of the 
thesis is that the equity risk premium, combined with the public nature of toll roads, 
makes private financing of this kind of public infrastructure undesirable.  It attempts 
to test this hypothesis by valuing the project under standard CAPM and WACC 
frameworks, and then modelling the sensitivity of the project’s value to different 
assumptions regarding traffic flows, inflation, asset risk, and errors in operating-cost 
forecasts.  The results show that with large equity contributions the project is 
inherently unstable and given the finance structure, was always susceptible to a 
downward price spiral of the type observed.  The thesis then models the project 
value under a public finance option and concludes that this is a more beneficial 
option for investors, the government, and the community alike. 
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Part 1 - Introduction 
The Committee for the Economic Development of Australia, (CEDA) states that 
‘[e]fficient and productive infrastructure is a prerequisite for economic growth and 
the international competitiveness of nations.’  (CEDA, 2005 : 5).  In a similar vein Sir 
Rod Eddington, Chair of the Australian Government’s infrastructure advisory body, 
Infrastructure Australia, has described the role of infrastructure as: 
‘essential to driving sustainable economic development and growth, 
lifting levels of productivity and boosting employment.  It is critical to 
encouraging business innovation and improving the global 
competitiveness of our industries.  It provides the foundation for vital 
community services such as schools, hospitals and housing.  It is the 
key to managing population growth and meeting current and future 
environmental challenges.  It is how high standards of living can be 
achieved.’  (Infrastructure Australia, 2008 : 1). 
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Clearly, appropriate infrastructure is vital to a modern economy.  However, recent 
times have seen rapid changes in the way infrastructure is created and financed.  For 
most of Australia’s 200-year history infrastructure has been provided almost 
exclusively by colonial, state and federal governments.  Today, an increasing 
proportion is provided by private enterprise or by partnerships between governments 
and private enterprise. 
 
Between 2000 and 2006, investment in infrastructure by public private partnerships 
(PPPs) totalled $16.6 billion (Chan, 2009 : 155).  In the decade to 2016, it is 
estimated that up to one quarter of public infrastructure spending will be privately 
financed (ABN AMRO, 2006).  Accordingly, significant amounts of debt and equity 
finance are now involved in the design, construction, operation and maintenance of 
Australia’s infrastructure.  But whereas governments can raise funds relatively 
cheaply, funds raised from equity attract a risk premium to compensate investors for 
the chance that they may not see a competitive return, or indeed any return, on their 
capital. 
 
The economic challenge to Australia is clear.  Without appropriate infrastructure 
investment and creation: 
‘Australia will find it increasingly difficult to build competitive 
industries that offer quality jobs.  It will become tougher to keep pace 
with scientific and technological change.  It will be harder to protect 
our natural environment, maintain and improve the liveability of our 
cities and secure viable futures for our regions.  The evidence is 
compelling.  Without adequate investment in infrastructure, Australia 
will struggle to achieve sustainable economic growth and improve the 
quality of life for current and future generations.’  (Infrastructure 
Australia, 2008 : 1). 
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This thesis will examine the issue of efficient infrastructure provision.  Particularly, it 
will concentrate on public private partnerships, an increasingly prevalent method of 
creating infrastructure, and use BrisConnections’ Airport Link project as a case study 
for exploring some of the impacts of private finance on public infrastructure 
provision. 
 
Ultimately the thesis will conclude that the method of private financing adopted in 
that particular case left the project vulnerable to downward price spirals if investors 
adjusted their expectations regarding the equity risk premium, the accuracy of traffic 
forecasts, or the appropriate average inflation rate across the 45-year concession 
period.  These risks are inherent in all toll road projects, but the equity contributions 
and concession agreement involved in this case exacerbated the project’s sensitivities 
and reduced flexibility in combating adverse financial conditions.  The thesis will 
compare the existing financing approach with an alternative model of infrastructure 
provision, namely the use of government bonds, and demonstrate the benefits of 
public finance over private. 
 
1.1  Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into six chapters.  The first is an introduction.  The second 
examines the economic theory underpinning the valuation techniques used to model 
returns to BrisConnections’ shareholders, while the third is an extensive literature 
review of infrastructure, risk, and PPPs in general.  The fourth chapter values the 
Airport Link project and models the sensitivity of the project to changes in 
expectations about different variables that may affect its worth.  The fifth chapter 
uses the findings of the fourth chapter to attempt to explain the collapse in 
BrisConnections’ share price and examines an alternative, public financing structure.  
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chapter six summarises the findings of the thesis and offers suggested areas for 
further research. 
 
1.2  Data 
The data required for this thesis consists of ASX market data, as well as data on 
Brisbane population growth and traffic flows.  Both of these data sets are easily 
obtained from either the ASX website, or from the Australian Bureau of Statistics.  
Specific information on these topics can also be found in BrisConnections’ own 
product disclosure statement and website, much of which has been used in the 
preparation of the financial forecasts of the project’s profitability.  Other required 
information includes the costs of the Airport Link Project and pricing data for 
BrisConnections’ shares.  Again, most of this data has been obtained from public 
sources.  In the case that data is unavailable, reasonable estimations have been used 
instead with appropriate margins of error taken into account. 
5 
Part 2 - Economic Theory 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter will explore some of the economic theory underpinning this thesis.  
Particularly, it will look at the phenomenon of the equity risk premium: what it is, 
how it is calculated, and how it has changed across countries and time.  The chapter 
will then look at the Capital Asset Pricing Model and explain the economic intuition 
behind this framework. 
 
2.2  The Equity Risk Premium 
The equity risk premium is, at its heart, a quantitative puzzle (Mehra, 2008 : 24).  
Rajnish Mehra, the first to document the puzzle and one of the leading writers in the 
area, explains that while contemporary economic theory is consistent with the notion 
that stocks should return more than bonds on average, ‘[t]he puzzle arises from the 
CHAPTER 2 - ECONOMIC THEORY 
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fact that the quantitative predictions of theory are an order of magnitude different 
from what has been historically documented.’ (Mehra, 2008 : 24) 
 
In short, when large sets of data are examined and given our current understanding 
of risk aversion, the return on stocks is far too high when compared to riskless 
assets.  Although there have been numerous explanations suggested for the equity 
premium, none have gained universal acceptance. 
 
2.2.1  Measuring the Equity Premium 
The equity premium is a long-term phenomenon.  As such, measuring the premium 
requires data sets that span many decades.  Most of those who have measured the 
equity premium, including Mehra and Prescott, have used data spanning almost two 
centuries.  It is therefore worth examining the data upon which these findings are 
based.  Although the quality of historical data for the equity risk premium varies, the 
results are consistent across different data sets, and across countries. 
 
The first element required in any calculation of the equity premium is a reliable 
indicator of market returns.  Because data is required over such a long time-frame, it 
is not always easy to obtain.  Data on equity returns before 1871 is unreliable, and 
most researchers tend to use the data provided by Schwert (1990).  Schwert’s work 
provides a ‘spliced’ stock-market index to cover the broad period of history from 
1802-1987 and is based on an analysis of how early stock market indexes were 
constructed.  The early part of this index, from 1802-1862, is based on the work of 
Smith and Cole (1935), who used various portfolios of bank stocks, insurance stocks 
and railroad stocks to compile a basic market index.  The later part of Schwert’s 
index, from 1863-1871, is based on data from Macaulay (1938), who used a portfolio 
of 25 railroad stocks to estimate the market index.  There is doubt about how well 
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this part of the index represents the ‘market’ as it clearly fails to take into account 
volatility in any other industry sector (Mehra, 2008).  These indices also excluded 
dividends, making any total return calculation impossible. 
 
Data after 1871 can be sourced in the work of Shiller (1989), itself established on the 
research of Cowles (1939).  For the early part of his index, Cowles used a value-
weighted portfolio consisting of between 12 and 351 stocks.  After 1918, his index 
was based on Standard and Poor’s industrial portfolios.  These indexes included 
dividend reports, allowing for total return calculations to be made. 
 
In 1926 the New York Stock Exchange database at the Center for Research in 
Security Prices was established, providing reliable, expansive data on equity returns.  
Useful compendiums of financial data from this date forward can be found in the 
Ibbotson Associates Yearbooks (Mehra, 2008 : 4). 
 
Just as various methods have been used to calculate appropriate market indices, 
similar approaches have also been used to find a relatively riskless asset with which to 
compare the returns on equity.  As treasury certificates only started to fulfil this role 
after 1920, there was no definitive, short-term risk-free rate for much of the 19th 
century.  In order to provide a comparison, data constructed by Jeremy Siegel can be 
used.  Siegel (2002) used highly rated securities as a proxy for a riskless asset.  
Interestingly, the equity premium calculated from the early part of this data set, 1802-
1862 is zero.  It has been suggested that this result arises from the fact that during 
this time there was no clear distinction between debt and equity securities, and that 
most financing was debt based (Mehra, 2008 : 4).  Data for the period prior to 1920 
can also be found in the work of Homer (1963).  Since 1931 it has become almost 
universal for short-maturity Treasury bills to be used as an indicator of a risk-free 
security. 
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Table 2.1, below, summarises the observed equity premium as measured from four 
datasets collated by various economists.  The datasets all pertain to the US market 
and were created using the various techniques explained earlier. 
 
Table 2.1 - Estimated Values of the Equity Premium (Mehra, 2008) 
Data set Mean real market return (%) 
Mean real riskless 
return (%) 
Equity premium 
(%) 
1802-2004 
(Siegel) 8.38 3.02 5.36 
1871-2005 
(Shiller) 8.32 2.68 5.64 
1889-2005 
(Mehra-Prescott) 7.67 1.31 6.36 
1926-2004 
(Ibbotson) 9.27 0.64 8.63 
 
While the US is often the focal point for equity premium observations, similar results 
are replicated across many countries with developed economies.  Table 2.2, below, 
shows the equity premium for some of the world’s largest economies. 
 
Table 2.2 -  Estimated Values of the Equity Premium by Country (Dimson, 2002) 
Country Period Mean real market return (%) 
Mean real 
riskless return 
(%) 
Equity 
premium (%) 
United 
Kingdom 1900-2005 7.4 1.3 6.1 
Japan 1900-2005 9.3 -0.5 9.8 
Germany 1900-2005 8.2 -0.9 9.1 
France 1900-2005 6.1 -3.2 9.3 
Sweden 1900-2005 10.1 2.1 8.0 
Australia 1991-2004 9.2 0.7 8.5 
 
To highlight the significance of the difference in return between funds invested in 
equity, and funds invested in ‘riskless’ bonds, Mehra (2008) presents a table showing 
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the terminal, real value of $1 invested in each type of asset over two different 
timeframes. 
 
Table 2.3 - Real Values of the Equity Risk Premium (Mehra, 2008) 
Stocks T-bills Investment 
period Real Nominal Real Nominal 
1802-2004 $655,348.00 $10,350,077.00 $293.00 $4,614.00 
1926-2004 $238.30 $2,533.43 $1.54 $17.87 
 
It is clear, then, that the equity premium is a significant and persistent phenomenon 
in capital markets.  If the data is broken up into various sub-periods, it is also clear 
that the equity premium has tended to increase.  During the period 1900-1950, the 
30-year moving average for the equity premium was 4.50 per cent, significantly less 
than its value of 7.42 per cent for the period 1951-2005 (Mehra, 2008 : 9).  As 
mentioned earlier, the equity premium was close to zero for most of the early part of 
the 19th century. 
 
The largest change in the equity premium occurred after 1933 when the premium 
rose from 3.62 per cent to 8.07 per cent.  Interestingly this date also marks the end of 
the United States’ dependence on the gold standard, however the exact transmission 
mechanism or significance this had for the equity premium is uncertain. 
 
2.3  Explanations for the Equity Premium 
Intuitively, it may seem reasonable that riskier assets should command a higher 
return.  That is, it could be said that the equity premium is simply a premium for 
holding non-diversifiable risk.  What Mehra and Prescott showed, in 1985, is that this 
conclusion cannot hold given what is known about people’s risk aversion and the 
variability in consumption data. 
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To see this, one must first understand how assets are valued under modern asset-
pricing theory.  The underlying assumption of asset pricing models is that an agent 
will only purchase an asset if the loss in marginal utility from giving up current 
consumption in order to pay for the asset is balanced by the expected gain in 
marginal utility when the returns to that asset pay off in the future (Cochrane, 2005 : 
3).  The state of the market when the payoff eventuates is therefore relevant to this 
assumption.  When times are good, consumption is high and the marginal utility to 
additional consumption is low.  Thus, if an asset pays off during ‘good times’, the 
expected marginal utility of the pay-off is low and consequently one would expect an 
agent to give up relatively little current consumption in order to get it.  Conversely, 
an investor should be more willing to give up current consumption in order to buy 
an asset that is expected to pay-off when consumption is low. 
 
Under the traditional paradigm for modelling asset prices, the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM), these notions are captured by the parameter, ‘beta’, which measures 
systematic risk.  Essentially, the model states that an asset with a high level of 
systematic risk, or a high beta, has a high expected-rate of return.  As an asset’s 
return is inversely proportional to an asset’s price, another way of stating this is that 
assets with high levels of systematic risk tend to be cheaper than those with lower 
levels of systematic risk.  Because, under CAPM, good and bad times are measured 
by a broad-based market index, the pay-offs to high-beta securities tend to coincide 
with high market returns and vice-versa. 
 
An alternative way to view the central tenet of asset pricing theory is in terms of 
consumption-smoothing.  Agents are assumed to prefer a constant, stable path of 
consumption to an erratic, unpredictable one.  Therefore, it is logical to assume that 
assets that have high returns during periods of low consumption will be more highly 
sought after than assets which give payoffs that co-vary closely with the level of 
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consumption.  Once these fundamentals are considered, measuring the equity 
premium becomes an exercise in determining the expected pay-offs to various assets 
(given our understanding of the riskiness of those assets) and comparing that to 
variances in consumption. 
 
Mathematically, it can be shown that the difference between the expected value of 
the return on equity, 
 
E
t
(R
e ,t +1
) , and the return on a risk-free asset, 
 
R
f ,t +1
, is equal to 
the covariance of the asset returns with the marginal utility of consumption (Mehra, 
2008 : 17). 
 
 
E
t
(R
e ,t +1
)! R
f ,t +1
= Cov
t
!U ' c
t +1( ) ,Re ,t +1
E
t
U ' c
t +1( )( )
"
#
$
%$
&
'
$
($
 (2.1) 
 
Thus, the question becomes whether the covariance of asset returns with the 
marginal utility of consumption is large enough to justify the observed difference 
between the return on stocks and the return on bonds.  Using a little algebra, it can 
be shown that: 
 
 
ln E R
e{ } ! ln R f = "#
2  (2.2) 
 
where !  is the risk aversion parameter and  !
2  is the variance of the growth rate of 
consumption.  Given that the value of  !
2  is approximately 0.001, any value of !  
would need to be extraordinarily high to give an equity premium somewhere in its 
observed range of six to eight per cent.  Thus, it can be concluded that it is highly 
unlikely the equity premium merely reflects some form of compensation for 
investors holding non-diversifiable systematic risk. 
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Since this observation was made many authors have put forward alternative 
explanations for the equity premium.  Although they are numerous they tend to fall 
into several categories, some of which will be addressed presently.  It should be 
noted at this point that a complete mathematical treatment of the equity premium is 
given in Mehra (2008), and a brief outline is given in Appendix I of this thesis. 
 
2.3.1  Risk-Based Explanations 
Risk-based explanations of the equity premium essentially modify standard asset 
pricing theories to generate larger premiums for holding non-diversifiable risk.  They 
fall roughly into four distinct categories: 
• preference-based theories, 
• diaster scenarios, 
• trading frictions, and 
• model uncertainty. 
 
Preference-based theories are in some sense the simplest solution to the equity 
premium puzzle.  They operate by postulating that an agent’s preferences are indeed 
much more risk averse than previously thought, or at least are more risk-averse under 
certain circumstances. 
 
Models that include preferences with habit persistence attempt to mimic an agent’s 
preferences where aversion to poor consumption outcomes is greater than what is 
generally assumed under the unaltered CAPM model.  However these models, such 
as Constantinides (1990) and Campbell & Cochrane (1995) still do not explain the 
significant amount of research indicating that aversion to risk in capital markets is 
low. 
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Mankiw (1986) proposes that the equity premium can be explained ex post if 
systematic risk is not spread equally across all agents in an economy.  In other words, 
if systematic risk (which is not easily diversified away) is concentrated in a small 
number of agents who will disproportionally bear the brunt of any downturn in the 
economy, then a higher premium will be demanded to hold that risk.  Under perfect 
market conditions this risk could be effectively spread through insurance and credit 
markets, however the problems that arise in differentiating between systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk means that these markets often do not exist. 
 
An alternative to assuming that agents are particularly averse to bad outcomes is to 
assume that the outcomes themselves are particularly bad.  This approach defines the 
‘disaster scenarios’ explanation for the equity premium.  Rietz (1998) and Barro 
(2006) offer some examples of this approach.  The model Rietz proposes is identical 
to the standard Mehra and Prescott (1985) model, except that it incorporates a small 
chance of a very large drop in consumption.  Specifically, it requires ‘a 1-in-100 
chance of a 25 percent decline in consumption to reconcile the equity premium with 
a risk aversion parameter of 10’ (Mehra, 2008 : 82).  Unfortunately, the implications 
this model has for movements of real interest rates after major consumption shocks 
do not translate into empirical observations. 
 
Trading-friction models explain how markets that are incomplete may give rise to an 
equity premium.  The market may be incomplete either because the assets able to be 
traded are restricted, or because some individuals are not able to participate in 
financial markets.  Examples of these models include Constantinides (2002) and 
Heaton (2000). 
 
Finally, explanations that rely upon model uncertainty presume that individuals do 
not know or understand the correct probability distributions of variables affecting 
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asset prices.  This marks a departure from standard asset pricing theory, which 
generally assumes agents to possess rational expectations.  Indeed, many have sought 
to explain the current global financial crisis by postulating that widespread use of 
incorrectly-specified models lead to the paradoxical situation whereby observing 
areas of safety in risk models in fact created risks.  These ideas are developed further 
in Persaud (2008) and Danielsson (2008). 
 
2.3.2  Non Risk-Based Explanations 
Recently, an emerging literature has attempted to explain the observed equity 
premium using devices or methods unconnected with the risk of the underlying 
assets.  Some models, for example, question the appropriateness of using Treasury 
Bills as an indicator for the inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution of 
consumption (Kydland, 1982), while others suggest that changes in Government 
regulations have biased the return on Treasury-bills downward, giving rise to a larger 
than normal equity premium (McGrattan, 2003).  
 
These models are not explored in any great detail here, however they are covered in 
some depth in Mehra (2008). 
 
2.4  The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
There are two basic approaches to valuing assets, often described as the ‘absolute’ 
and ‘relative’ pricing approaches (Cochrane, 2005, xiv).  Within the absolute 
approach, more commonly used in the academic field, each asset is priced with 
reference to its ‘exposure to fundamental sources of macroeconomic risk’.  
Consumption-based and general equilibrium models typify this approach.  
Alternatively, the ‘relative’ pricing approach values assets on the basis of the values 
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of other assets.  The Black-Scholes option pricing mechanism is a classic example of 
this approach. 
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) provides a mechanism for determining a 
stock’s price depending on its return and the correlation of that return with a market 
return.  Various versions of the model were proposed by a number of authors, all at 
approximately the same time.  William Sharpe (1964), John Lintner (1965), and Jan 
Mossin (1966) were some of those involved in the model’s early stages.  It is typical 
of an ‘absolute’ pricing approach, yet it also contains ‘relativistic’ components due to 
the fact that assets are priced ‘relative’ to the market portfolio.  No attempt is made 
to determine what the market portfolio is actually worth, or what drives the asset’s 
beta value (Cochrane, 2005 : xiv).  Nevertheless, it is one of the most widely used 
models in asset pricing, particularly for stocks, and for this reason it has been chosen 
as the basis of the valuation for the Airport Link project.  The Consumption-based 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM) is a related model that is often used in 
theoretical work examining the equity premium.  Under this model the equity 
premium is calculated with reference to covariance between aggregate consumption 
and the market portfolio, rather than any particular asset.    The CAPM model is 
given by equation 2.3: 
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In equation 2.4, 
 
µ
k
is the asset’s expected return, and 
 
µ
M
, µ
rf
respectively represent 
the expected return on the capital market portfolio and expected risk-free asset 
return  (Roman, 2004).  Essentially, the formula shows that an asset with risk will 
command a risk-premium that is above the risk free rate.  If the project includes debt 
financing as well as equity financing, then the cost of equity, Be, can be calculated 
using a weighted average of risk where the debt beta is assumed to be zero. 
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In equation 2.5, V represents the book value of the project and E is the amount of 
equity finance involved in the project (the difference between V and E being 
financed by debt).  This approach has been used in other papers to value privately-
financed toll roads in the United States (Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
This thesis aims to model the value of the Airport Link project under a variety of 
different assumptions using the CAPM model.  These forecast values will be used to 
calculate an appropriate share price for BrisConnections’ shareholders and through 
an analysis of the equity risk premium, the thesis will demonstrate the additional cost 
to the public of using private finance (and thus a commercial rate of return) 
compared to the relatively cheaper government bond rate. 
 
2.4.1  Criticisms of CAPM 
There are some shortfalls in the CAPM approach.  Notably, the model assumes that 
asset prices are normally distributed random variables, however empirical 
observations show that many asset types are more volatile than a normal curve 
would predict (Mandlebrot, 2004).  Also the model rests on the assumption that 
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variance is an adequate proxy for risk, and that investors’ expectations of risk are not 
biased.  The recent financial melt-down has shown that these issues are often 
intertwined, and behavioural-finance models attempt to show that ‘overconfidence’ 
can lead to myopic perceptions of an asset’s risk (Daniel, 2001). 
 
Finally, the model depends on the existence of a market portfolio, which, in theory, 
should consist of some amount of every asset people use as an investment (real 
estate, stocks, bonds, etc).  Most people simply use stocks as a proxy for all other 
types of assets, however it can be shown that such a proxy makes it impossible to 
test the validity of CAPM because the market portfolio itself is unobservable (Rolls, 
1977).  Despite these criticisms, however, CAPM remains a common and effective 
method of valuing stocks. 
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Part 3 - Literature Review 
3.1  Introduction 
The literature on infrastructure and public private partnerships is vast.  In order to 
deal effectively with such a large amount of material, this review is divided into four 
sections.  The first covers public infrastructure in general and Australia’s recent 
experience in infrastructure provision.  The second looks at public private 
partnerships in more detail: what they are, how they operate, and what their policy 
implications are for those communities that choose to use them.  The third section 
examines concepts of risk as well as the specific risk-factors that apply to 
infrastructure projects.  Finally, the chapter will discuss some of the socio-political 
theory that tends to colour debate over public infrastructure provision. 
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3.2  Defining Public Infrastructure 
Infrastructure can be thought of as ‘the long-lived structural assets that either 
facilitate the flow of goods, information and factors of production between buyers 
and sellers (economic infrastructure) or underpin the delivery of essential services 
such as health and education (social infrastructure)’ (Chan, 2009 : 26).  Alternatively, 
it can be thought of as the ‘facilities which are necessary for the functioning of the 
economy and society.  [They] are thus not an end in themselves, but a means of 
supporting a nation’s economic and social activity, and include facilities which are 
ancillary to these functions, such as public-sector offices or accommodation’ 
(Yescombe, 2008 : 1). 
 
Examples of ‘economic’ infrastructure include roadways, electricity providers, sewage 
plants, and ports, while ‘social’ infrastructure includes those institutions considered 
essential for a functioning society, such as schools, prisons, and libraries.  A further 
distinction can be drawn between infrastructure that consists of buildings or physical 
assets, sometimes referred to as ‘hard’ infrastructure, and ‘soft’ infrastructure that 
consists of services such as street cleaning or various kinds of education and training 
(Yescombe, 2008 : 2). 
 
There are many reasons for the state to be involved in the provision of these types of 
assets.  Chief among these are: 
• externalities may mean that the private-sector does not produce socially-
optimal levels of public infrastructure, 
• infrastructure which needs to be provided free of charge (such as street-
lighting or CCTV coverage) will not be provided without government 
involvement, 
• competition in infrastructure provision may be low or absent, 
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• where competition exists, ‘merit’ goods such as schools may not be 
provided to a sufficiently broad enough section of society, and 
• the long-term nature of many public infrastructure projects mean that the 
economic returns on an initial investment may not appear favourable to 
the private sector without public sector support (Yescombe, 2008 : 2). 
 
Similarly, there are also benefits to having private involvement in infrastructure 
projects.  The primary benefit is large reductions in costs.  Domberger and Rimmer 
collate over 20 studies by economists to conclude that in many cases, contracting out 
government services to private providers leads to cost-savings in the order of 20 per 
cent (Domberger, 1994 : 450).  This benefit is largely assumed to translate effectively 
into projects developed under a PPP.  Because the private sector will not be induced 
to enter a PPP contract and place its capital at risk until it is satisfied about the 
sustainability of the project, public private partnerships ‘can be an effective antidote 
to the temptations of short-termism’ in both the public and private sector.  (Gerrard, 
2001 : 49). 
 
3.3  Australian Public Infrastructure Spending 
Like most developed nations, Australia’s infrastructure has been built up over 
hundreds of years, and the funding to provide for it has varied in both scale and 
source.  Figure 3.1, below shows these characteristics of Australia’s infrastructure 
investment over the past 40 years.  It is easy to see that over the past few decades 
there has been a steady increase in the involvement of the private sector in 
infrastructure projects, accompanied by a corresponding decrease in public finance.  
It is also clear that the increase in private sector spending has not matched the public 
sector decline (Kenyon, 1997: 427). 
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Figure 3.1 - Infrastructure Investment in Australia (Chan, 2009 : 29) 
 
The decrease in public sector finance has been sustained, and is prevalent at all levels 
of government.  Data from the Australian Productivity Commission on public sector 
infrastructure spending makes this point clear (see figure 3.2, following).  This 
change in source of funding has been due to a number of factors, including: 
• a reluctance amongst governments to run cash deficits, 
• the complexities involved in the construction and management of large 
infrastructure projects, 
• the opportunity for improved risk-sharing between public and private 
parties, and 
• general acceptance that efficiency is improved under a ‘user-pays’ model 
(Williams 2005 : 418). 
 
Despite this financing shift from public to private, however, there has been little 
analysis of whether the benefits of this new method of providing infrastructure have 
exceeded the costs, or whether there are alternative, more efficient methods of 
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providing infrastructure that may include more or less government involvement.  
Many forms of infrastructure would initially appear unpalatable to private enterprise, 
yet on the other hand the plethora of BOOT projects (build, own, operate and 
transfer) and PPP endeavours indicate that there are some steps that may be taken in 
order to induce private enterprise to contribute infrastructure finance. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 - Public Sector Spending on Investment in Australia (Chan, 2009, 28) 
 
Simply cutting public spending for the sake of it, or adopting long-term aggregate 
targets for infrastructure spending makes little economic sense.  Instead, a case-by-
case approach should be adopted where an infrastructure project is undertaken only 
if it passes an appropriate cost-benefit test.  There may, of course, be circumstances 
under which increased public spending on infrastructure may be desirable from a 
macroeconomic viewpoint, however this would merely affect the timing of 
infrastructure spending and not, necessarily, the aggregate amount of any such 
spending.  The Business Council of Australia, for example, estimates that with 
appropriate infrastructure financing reforms Australia’s GDP could increase by as 
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much as two per cent per annum (Business Council of Australia, 2007 : 2).  In terms 
of the macroeconomic impact of investment in infrastructure, it is of course 
irrelevant whether the infrastructure is ultimately provided by public or by private 
enterprise. 
 
The decline in government infrastructure spending, and the admission by 
governments that private sector funding is viewed as an essential component of 
infrastructure planning (Chan, 2009 : 161) raises the unedifying prospect that there 
are currently a number of valuable projects that are simply not being undertaken due 
to a lack of public-finance involvement. 
 
3.4  A Brief History of PPPs 
Private involvement in public infrastructure is not new.  During the mid nineteenth 
century, private railway construction ‘overshadowed all other economic 
developments of the period’ (Briggs, 1959 : 296).  Tolls and turnpikes have also been 
used effectively by the United Kingdom and the United States in developing early 
highway infrastructure.  Turnpikes, in particular, have been described as ‘the 
precursors of the modern build operate and transfer systems’ (Smith, 1999a : 11), and 
were so successful in their early years that by the 1840s, ‘there were nearly 1000 
Turnpike Acts in force, promoted by town councils, merchants, manufacturers, 
farmers and landowners’ (Grimsey 2004 : 43).  The system of concessions has been 
central to French infrastructure development for more than 100 years, resulting in 
the fact that today, two PPP operators, Lyonnaise des Eaux and Veolia 
Environment, control ‘62 per cent of water distribution, 36 per cent of sewerage 
disposal, 75 per cent of urban central heating, 60 per cent of refuse treatment, 55 per 
cent of cable operation and 37 per cent of refuse collection’  (Grimsey 2004 : 47). 
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Importantly, public private partnerships represent a different form of infrastructure 
provision than privatisation, which occurs where a business formerly owned by the 
public is wholly transferred to the private sector (Gerrard, 2001 : 48).  Instead, the 
key feature of a public private partnership is that the government, rather than owning 
the infrastructure itself, contracts to buy infrastructure and infrastructure services 
(Grimsey, 2005 : xiv).  The essential role of the public in all PPPs is to ‘define the 
scope of business, specify priorities, targets, and outputs; and set the performance 
regime by which the management of the PPP is given incentives to deliver’, while it 
is for the private sector to ‘deliver the business objectives of the PPP on terms 
offering value for money to the public sector.’  (Gerrard, 2001 : 49). 
 
A feature of many PPPs, and the feature with which this thesis is concerned, is the 
‘commitment of private sector finance’ to the project (Grimsey 2004 : 59).  The 
particular form of finance involved, and the source of revenue with which the private 
sector will repay the financers is discussed below. 
 
3.4.1  Defining Public Private Partnerships 
The phrase ‘public private partnership’ can assume a ‘welter of meanings’ in 
contemporary discussions (Linder, 1999 : 39).  The Australian Government defines 
‘public private partnership’ as ‘a form of government procurement involving the use 
of private sector capital to wholly or partly fund an asset - that would have otherwise 
been purchased directly by the government - which is used to deliver Australian 
Government outcomes’ (Department of Finance and Administration, 2006 : 2).  
Linder himself describes PPPs as a ‘rubric for describing cooperative ventures 
between the state and private business’, (Linder, 1999 : 35) while Yescombe states 
that a PPP contains four key elements: 
• a long-term contract between a public and private party, 
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• for the design, construction, financing and operation of public 
infrastructure by the private party, 
• with payments over the life of the contract to the private party, made by 
either the public-sector party or users, and 
• with the infrastructure remaining in public ownership, or reverting to 
public ownership at the end of the contract.  (Yescombe, 2007 : 3) 
 
For the purposes of this thesis a suitable definition is that public private partnerships 
are simply ‘arrangements where by private parties participate in, or provide support 
for, the provision of infrastructure’ (Grimsey, 2005 : xiv). 
 
Table 3.1 - Public and private provision of infrastructure (Yescombe, 2007 : 12) 
 Public project    Private 
project 
 Public-Private Partnership 
Contract 
Type 
Public-
sector 
procurement 
Franchise 
(Affermage) 
Design-
Build 
Finance-
Operate 
(DBFO) 
Build-
Transfer-
Operate 
(BTO) 
Build-
Operate-
Transfer 
(BOT) 
Build-
Own-
Operate 
(BOO) 
Construction public public private private private private 
Operation public private private private private private 
Ownership public public public private 
during 
construction, 
then public 
private 
during 
contract, 
then 
public 
private 
Who pays? public users public 
or users 
public or 
users 
public 
or users 
private 
or users 
Who is paid n/a private private private private private 
 
Public private partnerships can take on a number of different forms, with differing 
levels of private involvement in each.  At one end of the spectrum is public sector 
delivery of services with only infrastructure-related services provided by the private 
sector.  At the other end of the spectrum is private-sector delivery of a ‘full range of 
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services to the community inclusive of infrastructure’ (Grimsey, 2005 : xvi).  This 
concept is demonstrated in table 3.1, above, which delineates the roles of public and 
private sectors in some common forms of PPP. 
 
These basic PPP frameworks can be subject to a myriad of variations.  Indeed, 
flexibility is one of the great benefits and driving philosophies behind PPPs 
(Reijneirs, 1994 : 137).  As such, one can expect to find tailor-made solutions for 
different projects in different parts of the world.  As mentioned above, however, one 
of the key features that distinguish PPPs from one another is the source of the 
revenue for the project.  The following table (table 3.2) from Beato and Vives 
summaries some basic PPP structures based on the level of public involvement, as 
well as source of revenue.  The source of revenue is important to private financiers 
because it determines: 
• the incentives of a private firm to adjust the cost and quality to 
consumers’ willingness to pay for them, 
• the amount and timing of public expenditures, and 
• the nature of the risks to which revenues are exposed.  (Yescombe, 2004 : 
64). 
 
For instance, the projects in zones II and IV are likely to generate efficiency 
improvements, even though the source of revenue is from public expenditure (Beato, 
1996 : 8).  Projects in zone VI, where the public sector is in charge of management 
but not finance, are less likely to generate efficiency returns.  Projects in zones I and 
III also generate significant incentives for improving quality and reducing costs, due 
to the fact that revenue is sourced from final users.  This means that the private 
company involved in these projects bears the commercial risk associated with the 
endeavour, and may also bear regulatory risk. 
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Table 3.2 - PPP structures (from Beato and Vives, 1996 : 7) 
MOF 
Private firm manages, 
owns and finances 
infrastructure assets. 
Zone I Zone II 
MF 
Private firm manages and 
finances infrastructure 
assets, but a public entity 
owns them. 
Zone III Zone IV 
OF 
Private firm owns and 
finances infrastructure 
assets, but a public entity 
manages them. 
Zone V Zone VI 
M 
Private firm manages 
infrastructure assets but a 
public entity owns and 
finances them. 
Zone VII Zone VIII 
 Private firm revenues 
from final consumers. 
Private firm revenues 
from a public entity. 
 
The growth of PPPs is linked to the relatively recent growth of project finance, a 
‘form of ‘financial engineering’, based on lending against the cash flow generated by 
[a] project’ (Yescombe, 2007 : 113).  The growth of project finance in Australia has 
been remarkable.  Data for the period from 2000 to 2005 is summarised in table 3.3, 
below, and the full table showing data for different regions of the world can be 
found in Appendix II. 
 
Table 3.3 - Project Finance Lending in Australia (Yescombe, 2007 : 118) 
(US$ millions) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Australia 5,099 4,459 8,948 6,511 13,129 9,745 
 
This aspect of public private partnerships is at the heart of this thesis.  As mentioned 
in the introduction, private finance tends to be more expensive than publicly raised 
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funds due to the premium investors require to compensate them for putting their 
capital at risk. 
 
3.5  Risk and Public Infrastructure 
There are at least nine categories of risk that face an infrastructure project.  These 
are: 
• technical risk arising from engineering and design failures, 
• construction risk arising from faulty construction and/or cost escalation 
and delays, 
• operating risks, including maintenance costs, 
• revenue risk, 
• financial risks from inadequate hedging of revenue streams and financing 
costs, 
• force majeure risk, 
• regulatory risks arising from planning changes, legal changes, and policy 
changes, 
• environmental risks, and 
• project default due to a combination of any of the above (Chapman, 
1997; Kerzner, 1989; Smith, 1990; Thobani, 1998). 
 
Accurately determining the existence and magnitude of these risks is essential to 
creating an efficient PPP and adopting an appropriate financial structure (Ward, 1991 
: 140).  The notion of ‘risk transfer’ underpins many PPPs, as ‘risk taken on by 
government in owning and operating infrastructure typically carries substantial, and 
often unvalued, cost’ (Grimsey, 2004 : 176).  Allocating some of this risk to the 
private sector can, in theory, lead to more efficient outcomes. 
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Although there are many types of risk that face an infrastructure project, there are 
two fundamental types of risk: idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk.  Idiosyncratic 
risk is risk that is unique to a particular asset.  In relation to a public project, it is 
derived from factors specific to that project, meaning that the idiosyncratic risk 
associated with one project or asset is uncorrelated with the risk of any other (LeRoy, 
2001 : 209).  This fact means that idiosyncratic risk can be effectively neutralised by 
aggregating investment in a number of different projects.  Some will encounter 
difficulties while others will experience windfall gains.  Because of this, the 
idiosyncratic risk associated with a large enough group of projects should tend to be 
zero.  Systematic risk, on the other hand, is the risk associated with the volatility of 
total output.  Unlike idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk is correlated across projects 
and therefore cannot be removed entirely by portfolio diversification.  It is also not 
removed by the size of government infrastructure holdings. 
 
Private financing is efficient at spreading idiosyncratic risk though insurance and 
portfolio diversification.  Thus, idiosyncratic risk is usually considered to be 
irrelevant in assessing the market value of any particular project.  Similarly, the fact 
that governments control vast numbers of projects also means that from a public 
financing perspective, idiosyncratic risks should cancel out in the final analysis.  
Although it is difficult to reduce the impact of systematic risk, it does tend to have a 
smaller variance than idiosyncratic risk (LeRoy, 2001).  The question therefore arises 
as how to best spread risk between the public and private sector. 
 
The most important characteristics of systematic and idiosyncratic risk is that it is 
very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between the two types of risk for a 
given project.  In turn, this makes it impossible to find effective insurance for 
systematic risk because no insurer can distinguish between the systematic risk 
associated with fluctuations in the economy and the idiosyncratic risks associated bad 
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management, planning, or other factors within the project’s control.  The reason for 
this difficulty can be analysed within the framework of principal-agent theory 
(Laffont 1989). 
 
Generally, an agent can be assumed to have more information about idiosyncratic 
risk where the agent is responsible for completing a project on behalf of a principal.  
This is because the agent is assumed to have private information about the project, 
or some other strategic advantage, that allows them to assess idiosyncratic risk more 
accurately than their principal.  Therefore, making the agent bear the risk associated 
with the project usually results in efficient outcomes because the agent has an 
incentive to minimise the idiosyncratic risk to which the project is exposed (Laffont, 
1989). 
 
An example would be a government-owned restaurant.  Since the returns from a 
restaurant are largely based on factors within the agent’s control (quality of service, 
food, cleanliness of the restaurant, etc), it is difficult for an outside principal to 
ensure that adequate steps are being taken to minimise the risks of bad returns 
accruing to the venture.  In this context, it can be explained why a privately-run 
venture will tend to ‘outperform hierarchical management systems of which public 
bureaucracies are the archetypal example’ (Quiggin, 1996 : 61). 
 
Thus, principal-agent theory suggests that wherever possible, the owner of a project 
should be the party with the most control over idiosyncratic risk.  The term ‘owner’ 
is used to denote the person who receives the income from the project. 
 
Typically, a choice between public and private sector involvement arises during three 
phases of an infrastructure project.  These phases are construction, operation, and 
ownership.  Each phase comes with specific risks, some of which will be more 
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important than others depending on the project involved (Forshaw, 1999 : 53).  The 
operational risks and requirements of a hospital or airport, for example, are 
significantly larger than the operational risks associated with a toll road. 
 
The large-scale nature of most public infrastructure means that construction is 
usually one of the most important stages of any given project.  Historically, 
construction was carried out by the government with public sector employees, 
however today it is more common to find construction contracts awarded by a 
process of competitive tendering.  This ensures that the agency problem is overcome 
as the contractor is made responsible for most of the risks associated with 
construction. 
 
A problem with private contracting, however, is that if the contractor becomes 
insolvent, or if the project fails in some other way, the government may need to 
assume ownership to ensure the continuation of some essential public service.  The 
government would therefore incur the costs of finding a replacement contractor, as 
well as the cost associated with the delay of the project (Smith, 1999b : 131). 
 
The analysis of risk with regard to the operation phase of an infrastructure project is 
often improved by breaking ‘operations’ down into two components: core 
operations and peripheral operations.  Core operations are those that involve a risk 
of large losses to the owner if they are not satisfactorily performed.  To continue 
with the airport example, the maintenance of a runway would probably be a core 
operation.  Cleaning of the airport, on the other hand, would most likely be a 
peripheral operation. 
 
Because of the importance of core operations to the success of an infrastructure 
project, the private sector should not be made responsible for them unless they are 
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also the owner.  Conversely, it is widely believed that privatisation of non-core 
operations can result in significant savings.  In their studies of United Kingdom 
projects, Domberger, Meadocroft and Thompson (1986) and Cubbin, Domberger 
and Meadowcroft (1987) have found that privatisation can yield savings of up to 20 
per cent.  This figure has been challenged though.  Paddon (1991) found that more 
recent tendering processes have only resulted in savings of six percent.  Others, such 
as Ganley and Grahl (1988) argue that the savings come from reductions in the 
wages paid to workers, or a reduction in the working conditions afforded to them. 
 
Turning to ownership, it is generally the case that because the owner of a project 
receives the income from that project they also bear the cost if a risk materialises.  
The principal-agent model therefore suggests that the owner should be the party with 
the most control over risk.   Because public policy decisions affect the risk of many 
infrastructure projects, public ownership is often the optimal outcome, particularly 
where the infrastructure project is part of a larger network (EPAC, 1995; London 
Economic Reviews, 1995).  For example, an airport’s profitability is likely to depend 
far more on government policy (environmental and noise restrictions, international 
treaties, tourism investment etc) than effective management of the airport itself.  
Thus, a private owner of such infrastructure ‘must either demand a large risk 
premium in addition to the usual equity premium or must demand guarantees of 
favourable treatment’ (Quiggin, 1996 : 65). 
 
Stiglitz points out that the incentives facing a private owner are not always 
compatible with good public policy.  Again using the example of an airport: 
‘[t]he private owners’ profits are derived today largely from 
commissions on sales at airport stores.  The longer individuals 
spend at the airport, the more the profits are increased.  
Randomness in security checks - making it necessary for individuals 
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to arrive early to ensure that they catch their planes - is, to the 
owners, a benefit, even if to both passengers and the airlines it is a 
huge cost.  Their incentives are not well aligned.’  (Stiglitz, 2008 : 
xiii) 
 
Further, if a service is considered essential, the delays associated with bankruptcy 
mean that the government is likely to effectively guarantee the viability of the firm.  
Thus, even in a notionally ‘private’ enterprise, the public may still bear most of the 
risk associated with failure. 
 
Finally, the BOOT model has been described as having a ‘superficial appeal, in that it 
appears to offer the public something for nothing’ (Quiggin, 1996 : 66).  
Alternatively, if normal economic principles are applied to evaluating each stage of 
an infrastructure project, the fact that private construction may be more efficient 
than public construction does not also mean that private ownership is also more cost-
efficient than public ownership.  Essentially, there is no clear justification for ‘tying’ 
these two stages together. 
 
Even if there are advantages to having private control of some operations, or 
perhaps private ownership of certain sections of a project, there is no clear reason 
why these private providers need to be the same company.  If a project is indeed 
more efficient in the hands of private ownership, there is little sense in transferring it 
to public ownership after an arbitrarily chosen time: 
‘In cases where public ownership and operation is more efficient than private 
ownership and operation, BOOT projects will be inferior to a system of 
competitive tendering for construction.  In cases where private ownership is 
superior, BOOT projects will be inferior to purely private projects.’  (Quiggin, 
1996 : 67). 
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3.5.1  Optimism Bias 
A further risk to PPPs (as well as traditionally-organised public projects) is ‘optimism 
bias’, or ‘the extent of cost overruns and revenue shortfalls on infrastructure 
investments’ (Grimsey, 2004 : 72).  The evidence that transport infrastructure 
projects are subject to overly-optimistic forecasts is compelling.  A study of 258 
projects in 20 countries by Flyvbjerg shows that costs were underestimated in 90 per 
cent of cases (Flyvbjerg, 2002 : 290).  As for traffic forecasts, an anlaysis of credit risk 
associated with toll roads conducted by Standard & Poor’s shows that, on average, 
traffic volumes were approximately 70 per cent of their predicted values during the 
first year of operation (Bain, 2002 : 3).  This figure was based on an anlaysis of 32 
projects around the world and significant variation was observed from project to 
project, with some traffic volumes as low as 30 per cent of their predicted values and 
others as high as 120 per cent of their predicted values. 
 
There is usually no single reason for appraisals of a given project to be overly 
optimistic.  Mackie (1998) identifies 21 sources of error and bias in transport 
projects.  Among these include objectives being unclear or in conflict with each 
other, uncertainty about the existing transport environment, ‘over-engineered’ 
solutions to give extra capacity, safety or access where such characteristics are not 
required, model error, and uncertainties regarding fares, travel speeds and service 
frequencies (Mackie, 1998 : 3).  Many of these risks apply to the Airport Link project, 
consistent with the fact that optimism bias is a significant factor in all toll road 
projects (Wibowo, 2005 : 623). 
 
3.6  Political Economic Thought and PPPs 
The modern philosophical foundation of the public private partnership is in large 
part based on the ideological spread of ‘New Public Management’ in a number of 
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OECD countries during the 1980s (Hood, 1995 : 93).  A key feature of this 
movement was the ‘disaggregation of public organizations into separately managed 
‘corporatized’ units for each public sector ‘product’’ (Hood, 1995 : 95).  
Consequently, this new form of political ideology lead to the privatisation of a range 
of previously government-provided services, and where these services were so 
essential that the government couldn’t privatise them completely, the public private 
partnership was a necessary compromise (Yescombe, 2007 : 16).  Just where 
economic theory states this dividing line should be drawn is, of course, a more 
difficult question to answer. 
 
At its heart, economics is a ‘school of thought’ concerned with how society manages 
its scarce resources (Mankiw, 2001 : 4).  Beyond this basic definition there exists a 
plethora of theories, methodologies and guidelines outlining the content of economic 
study (Hausman, 2003).  Some economists refuse to be bound to single definition of 
their subject (Lipsey, 1963), and many would argue that to do so would ‘constrain the 
problems that economists believe it is legitimate to tackle and the methods by which 
they choose to tackle them’ (Backhouse, 2009 : 231).  Nevertheless, a definition or 
theory can be extremely important in determining the direction of a piece of work, its 
focus, or its significance (Buchanan, 1964 : 214). 
 
In ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics’, Milton Friedman states that 
differences of opinion over ‘normative’ aspects of economics are largely sourced 
from ‘different predictions about the economic consequences of taking action - 
differences that in principle can be eliminated by the progress of positive economics 
- rather than from fundamental differences in basic values.’  (Friedman, 1953 : 5).  
Consequently, Friedman argues that theories should be judged by their ‘predictive 
power’ only, regardless of the validity or reasonableness of the assumptions made in 
constructing the theory (Friedman, 1953 : 8).  This school of thought underpins most 
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of the theoretical work in this thesis.  The phenomenon of the equity risk premium is 
itself a testament to the failure of contemporary economic models on risk aversion to 
accurately predict share returns in the real world - the ‘quantitative puzzle’ referred to 
earlier (Mehra, 2008 : 24).  Accordingly, the approach taken in this thesis is to 
reconcile observed equity premium phenomena with the effects of increased equity 
finance of public infrastructure.  In this sense, the normative and positive elements 
of this thesis are one and the same.   
 
The second theoretical foundation of this thesis concerns the demarcation of the 
roles of state and private enterprise, especially as they concern the public private 
‘partnership’.  Indeed, any analysis of PPPs necessarily has to accommodate the fact 
that the topic in question straddles the dividing line between that which is individual 
(private) and that which is communal (public).  These two terms are loaded with 
political, social, and economic meanings and it is appropriate to address their origins 
in order to determine how their current meanings apply to the topic at hand. 
 
Starting with the Oxford English Dictionary, the term ‘private’ is defined to mean 
‘[r]estricted to one person or a few persons as opposed to the wider community; 
largely in opposition to public’.  It is this last part of the definition, the contra-
distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’, which is common to almost all modern 
understandings of the two terms (Starr, 1988 : 7).  Nevertheless, the specific meaning 
attached to them varies widely.  Economists, for example, almost universally perceive 
markets to be ‘private’, yet they are unequivocally ‘public’ in sociological or 
anthropological contexts.  Even in an economic sense, what could be termed 
‘private’ has undergone remarkable transformation.  Young and Willmott, studying 
the development of the modern family, argue that larger homes with cars, televisions 
and other assets meant that more was invested in the ‘private’ space of the family and 
less in the ‘public’ sphere of taverns, parks and streets (Young, 1973).  Coupled with 
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this introversion of ‘private’ capital was a liberalisation of the state and individual.  
Weber describes the modern state as one in which public and private roles became 
ever more separated (Weber, 1968 : 1028-31), and Starr recounts that the ‘rise of the 
liberal state specifically entailed a sharpening of the public-private distinction’ (Starr, 
1988 : 10).  This deepening contrast between ‘private’ and ‘public’ makes the concept 
of a ‘partnership’ between the two all the more interesting. 
 
Importantly, the defining feature of a PPP, the notion of ‘partnership’, is a concept 
that is not always familiar to government institutions.  ‘The historically bureaucratic 
and strictly hierarchical organization which typically characterizes most public bodies 
is well recognized and all too familiar, but has no place in a culture where the project 
goals are paramount’  (Smith, 1999b : 133).  The challenge of dealing with 
bureaucratic bodies that are established to be adversarial in nature is significant, and 
much has been written about assembling teams in a manner so as to mitigate the 
effects of an overly-obnoxious polity (Wilson, 1995 : 44). 
 
These issues form the philosophical basis of this thesis.  Ultimately, it is hoped that 
exploring some of these issues in more detail to clarify some of the problems 
surrounding PPPs will allow future projects to more effectively fulfil their potential 
to ‘contribute significantly to efficiency and timing of infrastructural and other public 
service developments’  (Ribault, 1997 : 59). 
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Part 4 - Valuing Airport Link 
4.1  Introduction 
This part of the thesis will do two things.  First, it will value the Airport Link project 
from the standpoint of a prospective investor.  The value of the project will be 
conditioned only upon the information provided in the project’s product disclosure 
statement (PDS).  Second, it will model the sensitivity of this value to changes in the 
information provided in the PDS.  The results of these exercises will be used in part 
5 of the thesis to construct plausible explanations for the vulnerability of the share 
price to sudden collapse. 
 
4.2  The Airport Link Project 
BrisConnections is a private company that was recently awarded a concession by the 
Queensland Government to design, construct, operate maintain and finance a 
number of transport infrastructure projects around the city of Brisbane 
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(BrisConnections 2008).  One of these projects, called Airport Link, is ‘a 6.7 
kilometre multi-lane electronic free-flow toll road with dual 5.7 kilometre tunnels’ 
that will provide increased connectivity between Brisbane’s northern suburbs, 
Brisbane Airport, and the city of Brisbane itself.  A map of the project can be found 
in Appendix III. 
 
The project will be constructed as a joint venture between Thiess and John Holland 
under a ‘Fixed Time, Fixed Price Construction Contract’ and is due to open in 2012.  
The road will be operated as an electronic tollroad, with toll receipts to be collected 
by BrisConnections for a period of 45 years.  The toll may be increased in line with 
Brisbane CPI (BrisConnections 2008 : 3). 
 
Airport Link is expected to cost $4.8 billion, financed predominantly by bank debt 
(approximately $3 billion) with the remainder financed by equity.  The State of 
Queensland is only expected to contribute $47 million to the total construction cost 
(BrisConnections 2008 : 25).  The shares, structured as ‘partly paid stapled shares’ in 
‘BrisConnections Investment Trust’ and ‘BrisConnections Holding Trust’, were 
floated on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in August 2008.  The share 
structure meant that any pair of shares (one in the Investment Trust, and one in the 
Holding Trust) could only be traded as a single unit.  The shares were partly paid to 
the value of $1, with additional payments of $1 falling due on 29 April 2009 and 29 
April 2010.  Since trading began, the share price has fallen steadily, as shown by 
figure 4.1, below. 
 
Given the extensive role of private finance in this project and the unique risk factors 
involved in large-scale toll roads, it is hoped that an analysis of Airport Link will help 
shed some light on the potential dangers of PPPs, particularly as they regard the 
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increased cost of private finance due to the equity risk premium and the reduced 
flexibility in toll pricing schemes that comes with a rigid concession agreement. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 - BrisConnections’ Share Price (depicted in red) 
 
4.3  Traffic Forecasts 
Several pieces of information are required to value the Airport Link project.  Given 
that the project is a toll road, the first piece of information required is a reliable 
estimate of the number of vehicles (and types of vehicles, given the toll structure 
allowed under the agreement with the Queensland Government) that will use the 
airport link over the 45-year concession period.  This information can, in part, be 
found in BrisConnections’ PDS.  The second piece of required information is the 
precise toll structure that will be used to collect revenue from the project.  This 
information can be found in the concession agreement between the government and 
BrisConnections.  The final piece of information required is an estimate of the 
construction, operation and maintenance costs associated with the project.  Again, 
this information may be collected from the PDS. 
 
CHAPTER 4 - VALUING AIRPORT LINK 
41 
The traffic flow forecasts in BrisConnections’ PDS were carried out by Arup Pty Ltd 
(Arup), a ‘global engineering and consulting firm with extensive experience in traffic 
demand modelling and traffic and transport planning and engineering’ 
(BrisConnections, 2008 : 110).  Arup has completed traffic forecasting and modelling 
for other toll road projects such as the Brisbane Inner City Bypass, Bruce Highway, 
Brisbane Airport Northern Access Road, Ipswich Motorway, Centenary Highway, as 
well as various projects in Sydney, Melbourne, the United States and the United 
Kingdom.  Specialist consultants were employed by Arup to provide forecasts of 
Brisbane population and employment growth, and to provide specialist knowledge of 
trucking movements (BrisConnections, 2008). 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, private estimates of traffic volumes for toll road projects 
have a tendency to overestimate traffic demand.  Obviously, the financial viability of 
any traffic-related project will be closely associated with these forecasts (Flyvbjerg, 
2005 : 131).  As such, it is worth examining the assumptions made by Arup in 
determining their traffic forecasts. 
 
4.3.1  Population and Employment Growth 
According to Arup, the most important determinants of traffic on a road network 
are employment and population for the surrounding region (BrisConnections PDS, 
2006 : 113).  The population and employment data used by Arup were provided by 
Access Economics, and is summarised in table 4.1.  Broadly, this data is similar to 
publicly available population and employment data from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics. 
 
The link between increased population and increased traffic volumes on major 
arterial roads is well-established and forms a major part of most traffic-forecast 
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models.  Unfortunately, it is not possible to know precisely how Arup took 
population growth into account in this case.  On a broad level, however, there appear 
to be some significant discrepancies in the predicted growth rates of Brisbane’s 
population and the volume of cars using the Airport Link tunnel.  For example, the 
forecast growth rate of cars from 2012 to 2022 on many sections of the tunnel is 
about four per cent per annum (see is discussed further in section 4.4, below), while 
the forecast increase in population is only two per cent per annum for the ten years 
from 2011 to 2021.  There is no explanation in the forecasts for this discrepancy, or 
why a faster growing population implies a higher level of cars per capita. 
 
Table 4.1 - Forecast Population and Employment Growth (BrisConnections, 2008) 
Population (millions) Employment (millions) Forecast 
Year Brisbane South East Queensland Brisbane 
South East 
Queensland 
2006 1.848 2.689 0.968 1.318 
2011 2.064 3.015 1.122 1.522 
2016 2.294 3.362 1.229 1.679 
2021 2.532 3.722 1.330 1.825 
2026 2.766 4.089 1.431 1.960 
2031 3.001 4.460 1.536 2.124 
 
4.3.2  Public Transport 
The Brisbane City Council and the Queensland State Government have both 
invested heavily in public transport initiatives over recent years.  Nevertheless, there 
has only been a minimal increase in patronage, from 6.9 per cent in 1992 to 8 per 
cent in 2004.  Arup has assumed that the 8 per cent figure will be maintained over 
the forecast period.  Again, there are some reasons to question the validity of this 
assumption.  Reports show that the price of urban public transport fares and the cost 
of private motoring have changed significantly since 2004.  Figure 4.2, below, shows 
recorded and forecast costs of private motoring and public transport in Queensland. 
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Figure 4.2 - Motoring and Public Transport Costs (Apelbaum, 2008 : 45) 
 
Particularly, it would seem logical that any increases in public transport usage would 
be positively correlated with increases in private motoring costs.  This would explain 
the relatively mild growth in public transport usage over the period 1992-2004, as 
even though there was significant infrastructure investment, for much of this time it 
was still cheaper to operate a private car.  The fact that public transport costs are 
predicted to fall, while private car ownership costs are predicted to rise, may be a 
source of vulnerability for Arup’s forecasts. 
 
4.3.3  Traffic Annualisation Factors 
The model used by Arup to forecast traffic flows provides a figure for the number of 
vehicles using the road during a two-hour, weekday, peak-hour period.  To ‘scale up’ 
this figure to generate appropriate annual figures, an ‘annualisation factor’ was 
calculated by examining the differences in current daily traffic flows compared to 
peak-hour flows.  This method of traffic forecasting is commonly used in traffic 
forecasting projects.  The annualisation factor also takes into account the fact that 
drivers tend to prefer ‘untolled’ or free roads to toll roads. 
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4.3.4  Peak Spreading and Capping. 
‘Peak spreading’ occurs when travellers adjust their trips in order to avoid travel 
during the most congested time frames.  The Arup forecasts take this into account 
by assuming that drivers will undertake journeys before or after peak times if the 
model predicts that capacity is reached during any of the forecast peak times.  If 
these before and after periods also reach capacity, it is assumed that an alternative 
route is used or that the journey is not undertaken. 
 
4.3.5  Ramp-up 
When new components of a road network are introduced it takes some time before 
motorists become aware of its existence and the journeys for which it may reduce 
travel time.  Therefore, in the months immediately following the opening of the 
Airport Link toll road, it is expected that actual utilisation will be below the level 
forecast.  Arup has factored this into its estimates with a ‘Weighted Ramp-up Profile’ 
that assumes it will take 15 months before the project is at 100% utilisation. 
 
4.3.6  Other Assumptions 
As well as the key assumptions above, Arup has also assumed that it has adequately 
factored in any road capacity improvements that may be involved in the staged 
implementation of the Airport Link project.  This has been achieved by adjusting 
forecasts to take into account altered lane capacities, signalised intersection 
capacities, parking zones, clearzones and bus zones.  Arup has also used traffic 
growth data from the Airport Link feeder roads to help forecast traffic loads for the 
Airport Link itself. 
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Again, there is very little information on the precise methodology used by Arup in 
incorporating these variables in its ultimate forecasts.  Like many road projects, the 
end investor must rely heavily upon the information supplied by the builders with 
few avenues for reliable verification of data.  Table 4.2, below, shows the traffic 
forecasts that were produced by Arup for annual average daily traffic, taking into 
account the assumptions outlined above.  Table 4.3 is an adjusted forecast to take 
into account the ‘ramp-up’ period covering the first 15 months after opening. 
 
Table 4.2 - Average Annual Daily Traffic Forecasts (BrisConnections, 2008) 
Vehicle 
Class 2012 2016 2022 2026 2031 
Toll Section 1:  Bowen Hills to/from Kedron 
Motorcycle 897 975 1,258 1,385 1,399 
Cars 81,289 87,899 112,418 122,889 124,181 
Light 
Commercial 
Vehicle 
6,734 7,281 9,312 10,180 10,287 
Heavy 
Commercial 
Vehicle 
1,677 2,309 4,043 5,386 5,429 
All Vehicles 90,597 98,464 127,032 139,839 141,296 
Toll Section 2:  Bowen Hills to/from Toombul 
Motorcycle 671 795 823 955 1,001 
Cars 60,821 71,255 72,028 83,023 86,642 
Light 
Commercial 
Vehicle 
5,038 5,903 5,967 6,877 7,177 
Heavy 
Commercial 
Vehicle 
1,223 2,333 4,340 5,607 6,284 
All Vehicles 67,753 80,285 83,158 96,463 101,104 
Toll Section 3:  Kedron to/from Toombul 
Motorcycle 350 419 552 547 478 
Cars 31,542 37,600 48,452 48,021 41,438 
Light 
Commercial 
Vehicle 
2,613 3,115 4,014 3,978 3,433 
Heavy 
Commercial 
Vehicle 
809 1,205 2,690 2,726 2,889 
All Vehicles 35,314 42,338 55,707 55,272 48,237 
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Table 4.3 - Ramp-up Period - All Vehicles (BrisConnections, 2008) 
Months after 
opening Toll Section 1 Toll Section 2 Toll Section 3 
1 month 67,948 46,749 21,188 
3 months 78,819 56,912 27,898 
6 months 85,161 62,333 31,782 
12 months 87,879 65,043 33,195 
15 months 91,089 68,536 35,753 
 
4.4  Extending the Traffic Forecasts 
Because the Product Disclosure Statement only provides traffic forecasts for five 
years (2012, 2016, 2022, 2026 and 2031), it is necessary to interpolate forecast figures 
for the intervening years.  It is also necessary to come up with a growth figure for the 
years following 2031 until the concession period expires in 2053.  In order to get 
these forecasts, a linear growth rate was calculated for each vehicle type that would 
satisfy the condition: 
 
 
Vol
new
=Vol
old
(1+ r )
new!old  (4.1) 
 
Where Vol represents the forecast annual traffic volume, ‘new’ represents the latest 
forecast year (eg, 2022) and ‘old’ represents the earlier forecast year (eg, 2016).  This 
process gives a value for r that scales the forecast traffic volume by a constant 
amount for each intervening year between forecast periods.  For the period from 
2031 to 2053, the same growth rate is applied as that for the period from 2026 to 
2031.  The results of this process can be found in Appendix IV. 
 
After examining the forecast data it becomes clear that Arup’s forecasts assume that 
growth will be faster in the early years of the project (particularly from 2016 to 2022), 
with growth slowing afterward.  It is also apparent that heavy commercial vehicles 
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are forecast to have the strongest growth at almost 8 per cent per year for the period 
2012-2016, and almost 10 per cent per year for the period 2016-2022.  This is 
significant as heavy commercial vehicles are required to pay the highest tolls under 
the proposed toll-pricing scheme. 
 
Anomalously, section 3 is forecast to have negative growth for motorcycles, cars and 
light commercial vehicles from 2026 onwards.  Also anomalously, section 3 is 
forecast to have significantly positive growth in heavy commercial vehicles from 
2026 onwards.  It is difficult to find a justification for these figures in Arup’s 
forecasts, however it can be shown that the various assumptions regarding traffic 
flow growth rates tend to have a much less significant impact on the final share price 
than traffic flow discount rates, a result which will be demonstrated in the sensitivity 
analysis which follows. 
 
A potential issue with the forecasting approach outlined above is that the growth 
rates from 2031 onwards are assumed to be constant.  This implies that traffic 
growth on the toll road will continue indefinitely.  Ultimately, however, the Airport 
Link project must reach capacity and further growth in traffic volumes will become 
impossible.  To test the significance of this assumption, forecasts have also been 
conducted without assuming indefinite growth (that is, the traffic volumes predicted 
for 2031 are kept constant for the remainder of the project).  The results of this 
forecasting procedure can be found in Appendix V. 
 
When valuations were carried out on these two data sets it turned out that the 
difference in share price was relatively small.  This is partially the result of cancelling 
effects as the ‘continuous growth model’ predicts that a number of vehicle classes 
will actually decrease in the last few decades of the project.  The combination of 
decreased vehicles in some classes, but increases in others, means there is almost no 
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net gain in revenue under the continuous growth model compared to the former, 
fixed growth model. 
 
Given that there is no explanation in Arup’s forecasts for these differences the 
valuation method used calculates the average share price of the two models.  That is, the 
model is evaluated under the assumption of fixed growth and again under the 
assumption of continuous growth.  The two calculated share prices are then 
averaged. 
 
There are some other issues that need to be taken into account when altering the 
traffic forecasts so that they may be used to value the project.  First, the predicted 
start and end dates of the operational period of the project occur mid-year, meaning 
that the annual traffic forecasts for these years must be halved.  The mid-year cut-
offs result from the fact that the concession period begins at financial close (July 
2008) and continues for 45 years, meaning that it will expire during July 2053.  As for 
the starting date, the project is scheduled to open in June 2012.  To take these facts 
into account, the traffic forecasts for the first and last years have been reduced by 
50%. 
 
Second, the ramp-up period has been accommodated by discounting the annual 
traffic forecasts during the first two years of the project.  Because the valuation 
method used calculates revenues on an annual basis, rather than the monthly basis 
used in the ramp-up profile, the precise discount value has been chosen using an 
arithmetic averaging process.  For example, the ramp-up profile presented in the 
product disclosure statement predicts traffic reductions of between 10 and 30 per 
cent over the first six months.  Thus, the traffic forecasts for the first year (which 
have already been discounted by 50 per cent because the project will only become 
operational half-way through 2012) have been discounted by a further 20 per cent.  A 
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discount value of five per cent has been used for the second year of the project, 
which is again an average of the predicted 10 and zero per cent deviations from 
actual forecasts over the last 12 months of the ramp-up period.  Ultimately, these 
ramp-up adjustments make relatively small impacts on the final share price. 
 
Finally, the PDS claims that debt repayments are resilient to a 40 per cent decline in 
traffic volume over the concession period.  Correspondingly, the model has been 
constructed in such a way that traffic loads can be decreased or increased by varying 
amounts in each year of the project.  The results of this testing is presented in section 
4.10 where a full sensitivity analysis of the project is conducted. 
 
4.5  Toll Structure and Inflation 
The concession granted by the Queensland Government allows BrisConnections to 
charge a toll of between $4.00 and $10.60 on traffic using the tunnel depending on 
the class of vehicle involved (car, light commercial vehicle, or heavy commercial 
vehicle) and the section or sections of the tunnel that are used during the journey.  
The fees, inclusive of GST, are outlined in table 4.4, below. 
 
Table 4.4 - Toll Structure - 2006 Dollars (BrisConnections, 2008) 
June 2006 Price June 2012 Price (Forecast) 
Vehicle Type 
Sections 1& 2 Section 3 Sections 1 & 2 Section 3 
All Cars $4.00 $3.00 $4.76 $3.57 
Light 
Commercial 
Vehicles 
$6.00 $4.50 $7.14 $5.36 
Heavy 
Commercial 
Vehicles 
$10.60 $7.95 $12.61 $9.46 
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These tolls may be increased annually in accordance with the Brisbane Consumer 
Price Index (CPI).  In the PDS, BrisConnections has used the following estimates for 
Australian and Brisbane CPI. 
 
Table 4.5 - CPI and Inflation Forecasts (BrisConnections, 2008) 
Australian CPI  Brisbane CPI  Period 
3.20 3.50 Financial Close - 31 December 2013 
3.00 3.30 1 Jan 2014 - 31 Dec 2018 
2.70 3.00 1 Jan 2019 - 31 Dec 2028 
2.65 2.95 Remainder of the Concession 
 
It is intriguing that the PDS assumes such a high inflation rate.  Because the toll 
BrisConnections can charge is limited to CPI (and assuming BrisConnections will 
increase the toll in line with CPI at every possible opportunity), a higher expected 
inflation figure means the project tends towards a higher net present value.  
Primarily, the reason for this rests in the fact that BrisConnections has hedged their 
interest rate exposure for debt, and a higher inflation rate simply ‘inflates away’ the 
debt repayments required over the life of the project.  The disclosure statement 
explicitly states that: 
‘BrisConnections assumes that a differential will exist between 
Brisbane and Australian CPI, driven by BrisConnections’ higher 
growth forecasts for Brisbane than Australia as a whole. 
BrisConnections’ assumption for Australian CPI is that it will 
revert to the Reserve Bank of Australia’s long term target range 
of 2–3% after declining from current levels in excess of that 
range’  (BrisConnections, 2008 : 93). 
 
However this statement appears to contradict the figures provided by 
BrisConnections in their table of forecast inflation figures.  If it was assumed that 
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inflation would ‘revert’ to the Reserve Bank’s long-term target, then a figure of 2.5 
percent should be used.  In any event, the assumptions underlying Brisbane’s CPI 
being higher than Australian CPI appear not to have been borne out.  Inflation in the 
Brisbane CPI for the year June 08 to June 09 was only two per cent (Queensland 
Government, 2009), and continuing economic sluggishness as a result of the GFC 
appears to cast doubt on the assumption that Brisbane’s CPI will remain above 
Australia’s.  Certainly, it appears unlikely that inflation will remain as high as 3.3 per 
cent (on average) until 2018.  BrisConnections’ assumptions about the Australia-wide 
CPI figure seem similarly inaccurate, however they are not relevant to an assessment 
of the Airport Link project itself. 
 
4.6  Operation and Maintenance Costs 
The operation and maintenance costs given in the PDS are for the first year of 
operation and are broken down as follows: 
 
Table 4.6 - Forecast Annual Operating Costs (BrisConnections, 2008) 
Road Operations and Maintenance $20 Million 
Tolling & Customer Service $29 Million 
Administration Costs $12 Million 
Insurance Costs $2 Million 
Total (adjusted for rounding errors) $64 Million 
 
In the revenue forecast that follows, the operating cost of $64 million is adjusted for 
inflation and used for each operational year of the concession period.  Again, there is 
scope to argue that these operating costs may have been underestimated.  Flyvbjerg, 
for example, finds that average costs were 20 per cent higher than forecast in a study 
of over 160 different road projects (Flyvbjerg, 2002 : 290). 
 
CHAPTER 4 - VALUING AIRPORT LINK 
52 
The valuation model used includes a variable for increasing the base operational cost 
by a fixed percentage.  It can be shown that even modest increases in the operating 
cost variable can have significant impacts on the overall value of the project. 
4.7  Other Forecasting Issues 
There are three outstanding issues regarding the valuation of BrisConnections that 
deserve attention.  The first relates to the projects’ debt financing arrangements.  
Although a significant portion of the BrisConnections project is equity financed 
(approximately $1.8 billion), the majority of the project is debt financed 
(approximately $3 billion).  The project is currently scheduled to refinance its debt 
several times over its lifetime, however it is of course impossible to know exactly 
what terms this refinancing will contain, or the rate at which it will need to be paid 
back.  The PDS states that the predicted nominal interest rate payable on the Term 
Debt Facility is between 8.66 and 8.77 per cent (BrisConnections, 2008 : 94).  The 
narrowness of the band is due in part to the fact that BrisConnections has entered 
into interest-rate hedging agreements and will continue to hedge its interest rate 
exposure until at least June 2018 (BrisConnections, 2008 : 94).  Accordingly, the debt 
return factor used in the revenue forecasts is 8.7 per cent. 
 
In terms of debt structure, it is the intention of BrisConnections to enter into 
‘interest-only’ refinancing agreements approximately once every six years until 2035.  
The outstanding debt will then be repaid over the remaining 18 years of the 
concession period to leave no debt outstanding by the time the concession ends in 
2053 (BrisConnections, 2008 : 95).  To take this structure into account the predicted 
debt level at the opening of the project has been used and an appropriate yearly 
payment calculated to pay off the interest.  This payment structure continues until 
2035.  In 2036, the outstanding debt is then paid off in order to leave no debt 
outstanding by 2053. 
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The PDS claims that the debt servicing payments are resilient to a 40 per cent 
decrease in forecast traffic flows in each year (BrisConnections, 2008 : 15).  There are 
no similar claims as to the resilience of equity contributions to such a large decrease 
in traffic volume.  This claim will be tested in the forecast and sensitivity analysis that 
follows. 
 
The second issue that deserves to be addressed is the proposed Distribution 
Reinvestment Plan (DRP).  The DRP is an ‘opt-out’ plan under which an investor 
may receive dividends in further issues of stapled units rather than cash.  Units 
received under the DRP will be partly paid to the value of $1 or $2 (depending on 
when the units are received), with the investor remaining liable for the remaining 
instalments to fully pay the $3. 
 
The DRP is expected to raise $361 million and is underwritten by Macquarie Capital 
Advisers Ltd to the extent that investors choose not to participate in the plan 
(BrisConnections, 2008 : 25).  According to the 2009 Preliminary Full Year Report, 
only 82 shares had been issued under the DRP (BrisConnections, 2009 : 37).  This 
can be explained by investor’s preferences for cash dividends rather than more 
shares, particularly given the partly-paid share structure which means that each 
additional share is subject to a $1 or $2 liability.  The rapid collapse in share price 
after the float of the stapled units meant that few investors chose to remain in the 
DRP. 
 
To factor in the DRP, share values are calculated by dividing the net present value of 
the income from tolls by the 408 million shares in the initial offer plus the 
approximately 180 million shares that will need to be offered under the DRP in order 
to raise the $1.8 billion in equity required to fund the project.  This process accounts 
for the fact that by the time investors are actually receiving dividends from the toll road 
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itself, rather than from discretionary, board-declared payments, the number of shares 
in the project will have increased substantially. 
 
The final issue concerns the proposed Deferred Equity Tranche (DET).  John 
Holland Trustee and Thiess Trustee have agreed to subscribe for $200 million shares 
at $3.93 per share (approximately 51 million shares) under a Deferred Equity 
Commitment Deed (BrisConnections PDS, 2008 : 89).  The payment for these 
shares represents about 11 per cent of the notional equity in the project and are 
secured by ‘unconditional direct pay letters of credit’.  The shares in the DET will be 
subscribed for at the earlier of 71 months after financial close or 24 months after the 
completion of construction.  Until the $200 million payment is made by John 
Holland and Thiess the project will take out a $200 million equity bridge facility to 
cover construction expenses. 
 
It is expressly provided in the disclosure statement that John Holland and Theiss 
may nominate a third party to assume liability for the deferred equity tranche, so long 
as that party is able to provide unconditional letters of credit and the State 
Government consents. 
 
To factor in the DET, the net present value of the project will be divided by the 480 
million shares in the initial offer, plus the 180 million for the DRP, plus the 51 million 
required for the deferred equity tranche.  This gives a total of 640 million shares by 
the time the toll road is actually operational.  This figure is the preferred figure for 
calculating the long-term net present value of a single share because it represents the 
number of shares that will actually be on the market at the time distributions will be 
paid out of toll revenues. 
 
CHAPTER 4 - VALUING AIRPORT LINK 
55 
4.8  Calculating a Discount Rate 
Future cash flows may be discounted by a ‘discount rate’ to give a present value for 
that future cash flow.  The selection of the discount rate is important, for it will 
determine whether an investor will find an asset based on future cash flows attractive 
compared to its present-value cost.  Discount rates must generally take into account 
the fact that money has a ‘time value’ (value that accrues at a distant point in the 
future is less valuable than value that accrues immediately) and also the risk that the 
return will not eventuate. 
 
A common way of calculating a discount rate for valuing future cash flows is to use 
the ‘Weighted Average Cost of Capital’ (WACC).  The WACC is mathematically 
defined as: 
 
 
W = e
E
V
+ k
D
V
1! t( )  (4.2) 
 
Where e represents the after-tax average cost of equity capital, k represents the 
before tax average cost of debt, t represents the corporate tax rate, D represents the 
market value of debt in the project, E represents the market value of equity in the 
project, and V represents the total ‘book value’ of the project defined as being equal 
to E + D.  The WACC is interpreted as the cost to the firm of its current capital 
structure, as well as the cost of acquiring new capital if the existing capital structure is 
maintained (Bierman, 2007 : 209). 
 
Many of these variables are easily obtained from the PDS.  The corporate tax rate is 
30 per cent and the average cost of debt is assumed to be 8.7 per cent in line with the 
discussion on hedged rates above.  The values of E and D (and therefore V) are also 
readily determined as being $1.787 billion and $3.055 billion respectively.  The only 
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remaining variable is the average cost of equity, e, which will be determined using 
CAPM as discussed in chapter 2. 
 
CAPM provides a mechanism for determining a stock’s price depending on its return 
and the correlation of that return with a market return.  The model states that the 
cost of equity, e, is dependent upon the risk free rate, f, the market return rate, m, the 
project’s equity beta, Be, and the project’s asset beta, ! .  The equity beta is calculated 
using a weighted average of risk where the debt beta is assumed to be zero. 
 
 
Be = !
V
E
"
#$
%
&'
 (4.3) 
 
Therefore, the remaining variable to be calculated is the asset beta, ! , which links 
the expected return on a particular asset in the market portfolio to a linear function 
of the return on the market portfolio (LeRoy, 2001 : 190).  The slope of this linear 
regression line is given by equation 4.4. 
 
 
! =
Cov(k, m )
"
M
2
 (4.4) 
 
Where k is the asset’s return, m is the return on the market portfolio, and the 
denominator is the variance of the return on the market portfolio.  Using publicly 
available data on BrisConnections’ shares and the ASX 200 (used here as a proxy for 
the market portfolio), the following end-of-month prices and returns can be obtained 
(see table 4.7, following). 
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Of note is the 1-month return value for April 2009.  This figure of 539 per cent is 
the result of the payment of the second instalment in the payment plan, paid on 29 
April 2009. 
 
Table 4.7 - Market Returns and BCSCA/BCSCB Returns 
Date End-Month Share Prices 
Monthly 
Returns 
ASX 200 
Closing level 
Monthly 
Returns 
Jul-08 0.39  4977.4 -0.046 
Aug-08 0.14 -0.641 5135.6 0.0312 
Sep-08 0.04 -0.714 4600.5 -0.104 
Oct-08 0.001 -0.975 4017.9 -0.127 
Nov-08 0.001 0 3742.5 -0.069 
Dec-08 0.001 0 3722.3 -0.005 
Jan-09 0.001 0 3540.7 -0.049 
Feb-09 0.001 0 3344.5 -0.055 
Mar-09 0.001 0 3582.1 0.071 
Apr-09 0.54 539 3780.5 0.055 
May-09 0.49 -0.093 3818 0.001 
Jun-09 0.61 0.245 3954.9 0.036 
 
Using the data above, it is relatively straightforward to calculate the beta value for 
BrisConnections’ shares.  If the abnormal value for April 2009 is excluded, the beta 
value obtained is 3.12.  If the April 2009 value is included, the beta value is calculated 
to be 88.8.  Both of these values are exceptionally high, reflecting the fact that the 
share price has been extraordinarily volatile and that the stocks do not have a very 
long pricing history. 
 
To generate a useful beta value then, it is necessary to look at similar projects in 
other parts of Australia and around the world.  The Transurban Group is listed on 
the ASX and is in the business of owning, developing and operating toll roads in 
Australia.  Estimates for the beta value of its stock ranges from 0.43 (Reuters, 2009) 
to 0.73 (Financial Times, 2009).  More generally, betas for toll road companies have 
been observed to average between 0.6 to 0.8 (Estache, 2000 : 261; Alexander, 2000).  
CHAPTER 4 - VALUING AIRPORT LINK 
58 
A conservative, ‘mid-range’ value would therefore appear to be 0.5.  In any event, it 
is possible to work out the cost of equity using a range of beta values. 
 
The risk free rate and market rate are taken from the data established in Dimson 
(2002) and presented in table 2.2, above.  This data yields an equity premium of 8.5 
per cent, and makes it possible to work out an appropriate discount rate based on the 
WACC: 
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Where: 
 
e = f + Be m ! f( )
= 0.7 + 1.37 9.2 ! 0.7( )
= 12.33
 (4.6) 
 
Be = !
V
E
"
#$
%
&'
= 0.5 4.889 /1.787( )
= 1.37
 (4.7) 
 
Thus, the appropriate discount rate should be 7.22 per cent.  As should be obvious 
from the equations, this rate is proportional to the cost of equity and debt.  If the 
equity premium rises (perhaps through an increased return to the market portfolio) 
then the discount rate will rise.  Similarly, if the project’s asset beta is assumed to be 
higher, the discount rate will rise.  Table 4.8, below, shows calculated discount rates 
for different assumptions about the asset beta.  Using these rates, it is now possible 
to value the Airport Link Project. 
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Table 4.8 - Beta Calculations 
Asset Beta (! ) WACC (%) 
0.4 6.4 
0.5 7.2 
0.6 8.1 
0.7 8.9 
0.8 9.8 
 
4.9  The Forecast Value of Airport Link 
Using all of the information above, the net present value of Airport Link has been 
calculated using the following formula: 
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Where c, l and h are vectors representing the forecast number of each kind of 
vehicle (cars and bikes, light commercial vehicles, and heavy commercial vehicles) in 
each section of the tunnel, pc, pl, and ph are vectors for each vehicle type representing 
the inflation-indexed toll price for each section of the tunnel, o represents the 
forecast operating costs (indexed to inflation), and r represents the forecast debt 
repayments.  W represents the weighted average cost of capital, and t is an index 
number for each period of the concession. 
 
The value for r is worked out using equation 4.9, following, for the years in which 
BrisConnections will only pay off the interest on outstanding debt (2008 to 2035).  
For the remaining 18 years of the project (from the 27th concession year until the 
45th), the value for r is worked out using a standard loan repayment formula 
(equation 4.10). 
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Intuitively, these equations (4.8 to 4.10) represent the fact that the value of the 
project is based on the discounted cash flows from the project (toll revenues minus 
debt repayments).  Using this formula, assuming that all of the predictions made in 
the PDS hold, and assuming a relatively low asset beta of 0.5, the net present value 
of the Airport Link Project is approximately $3.3 billion.  As this value has been 
discounted for debt repayments, it represents the present value of all income flows to 
the company from tolls. 
 
Dividing this amount by the 640 million shares that will eventually be issued in the 
project (and averaging the result across the two models, one for constant traffic 
growth, one for fixed growth) yields a share value of $5.27.  This is a high value given 
that a fully paid share costs $3, and an obviously attractive investment.  The output 
from the excel model can be found in Appendix VI. 
 
The discrepancy between the $3 ask price and the $5.27 net present value represents 
a significant arbitrage opportunity.  However, this share price has been calculated 
under the relatively generous assumptions made in the PDS, and it is clear that the 
market had a radically different view of the project’s present value.  In order to 
determine which factors were most likely to have disturbed the $5.27 forecast price, 
it is necessary to conduct a sensitivity analysis to see how the model’s valuation is 
affected by variable shocks. 
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4.10  Sensitivity Analysis 
To ascertain the stability of the forecast value of the Airport Link project, the 
parameters of the valuation model were changed and the effects on the share price 
recorded.  The main inputs into the model are: 
• the inflation rate (broken down into four time periods: 2008-2013, 2014-
2018, 2019-2028, and 2029-2053). 
• the asset beta for the transport industry, 
• the traffic discount rate, 
• the equity premium (measured as the difference between the real market 
and risk-free rate), 
• the cost of debt, and 
• annual operation costs. 
 
Each of these different variables will be addressed in turn before some plausible 
scenarios combining multiple variable shocks are modelled. 
 
4.10.1  The Inflation Rate 
As mentioned above, one of the key determinants of the net present value in the 
current financing structure is the inflation rate.  Because the asset that an investor 
purchases (the right to future income streams from the Airport Link project) is 
indexed through the tolls to Brisbane CPI, a higher inflation rate yields a higher value 
per share.  This might explain the fairly high inflation rates assumed in the PDS.  
Figure 4.3, below shows the average share price for different inflation rate 
expectations, but maintaining all the other assumptions in the PDS and using an 
asset beta value of 0.5. 
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As expected, a higher inflation rate (but keeping the discount rate fixed to the 
WACC) means that the debt repayments are ‘inflated away’ while the equity returns 
are shielded through their indexation to Brisbane CPI.  The share price for an 
average inflation rate of 2.5 per cent, which seems a more reasonable estimate, is 
$3.65.  Thus, even a relatively modest adjustment to the assumptions in the PDS has 
lead to a significant revision in price. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 - Share Value vs Average Inflation Rate 
 
Because 2.5 per cent seems to be a more reasonable estimation of the long-term 
inflation rate facing the project, this value for inflation will be maintained for the rest 
of the sensitivity analysis. 
 
4.10.2  The Asset Beta 
Although the usual beta used for transport projects is about 0.5, there is evidence to 
suggest that a higher beta value may be appropriate.  The New South Wales 
Government, for instance, uses a value of 0.6 (New South Wales Government, 2007 
: 27) and the fact that the calculated beta values for the BrisConnections shares were 
so high would suggest that a larger value may be more appropriate.  Figure 4.4, 
below, shows the forecast share value for different asset beta assumptions.  The 
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inflation rate is set to 2.5 per cent for the life of the project, but otherwise all the key 
assumptions of the PDS are maintained. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 - Share Value vs Asset Beta 
 
It can be seen that the expected outcome is obtained: as the risk of the project 
increases, the share value falls.  The predicted values of the shares with a beta value 
of 0.6 is $2.90, and at a beta value of 0.7, the upper end of the scale for transport 
projects, the shares are worth just $2.30.  These values are significantly below the $3 
ask price, and an investor who was worried about the risk inherent in the project 
would find the shares to be an unattractive investment on the basis of a cost-benefit 
analysis. 
 
4.10.3  Traffic Discount Rates 
Traffic volumes are crucial to the profitability of toll road projects.  Figure 4.4, 
below, shows the forecast value of Airport Link shares under a variety of different 
traffic volume discount rates.  The discount rate has been applied to traffic volumes 
in all years of the project.  For instance, a discount rate of ‘0.1’ represents a 10 per 
cent decline in all vehicle types in each year of the concession period.  The 2.5 per 
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cent inflation assumption has been maintained and a beta value of 0.5 has been used 
in calculating the share values. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 - Share Value vs Traffic Discount Rate 
 
As expected, the project is highly sensitive to forecast traffic flows.  The relationship 
is also highly linear.  If traffic forecasts fall by just 10 per cent, the forecast share 
value drops significantly to $2.58, demonstrating that quite minor inaccuracies in 
traffic forecasts will make the entire project appear unpalatable to prospective 
investors during the period in which remaining instalments on the partly paid shares 
are outstanding. 
 
The claim in the PDS that debt servicing payments are able to withstand a 40 per 
cent decline in traffic flows in each year appears to be correct, as the share value for 
the project under the generous inflation assumptions in the PDS is just $0.30 with a 
40 per cent reduction in forecast traffic.  This represents the fact that nearly all 
revenues from tolls will be required to pay off the project’s debt if traffic levels fall 
so low.  If the model is changed so that debt repayments are calculated solely on an 
‘interest only’ basis for the life of the project, rather than just the first 27 years, it is 
predicted that the debt is serviceable even under a 44 per cent fall in traffic volumes, 
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however it is unclear how the principal loan amount will be repaid under this 
scenario.  Although the precise valuation model used by the financiers of the project 
remains unknown, the fact that similar results can be demonstrated using the model 
chosen in this thesis gives some credibility to the results obtained.  Broadly, these 
findings support the empirical evidence presented in chapter 3, specifically the 
findings by Flyvbjerg (2002), Bain (2002) and Grimsey (2004), that toll road projects 
are highly sensitive to traffic forecasts. 
 
4.10.4  The Equity Risk Premium 
An increase in the equity risk premium may explain the falling share value of the 
project.  Specifically, it can be argued that the global financial crisis has increased the 
premium investors require for subjecting their capital to risk (Graham, 2009 : 14).  
Also, the low share prices associated with an economic downturn are coupled with 
higher expectations of future returns, while the ‘risk free’ rate can be expected to 
decline as the relative safety of bonds pushes prices up and returns down (Graham, 
2009 : 7).  As stated by Donald Kohn, Vice Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, 
during the financial crisis risk ‘on a variety of assets had not been priced 
appropriately, and risk spreads in a range of markets increased, as did the equity risk 
premium.’  (Kohn, 2009) 
 
For all of the variables analysed above an equity risk premium of 8.5 per cent has 
been used.  This figure is based on market data for Australia from 1990 to 2005 from 
Dimson (2002).  Because the data provided by Dimson includes a relatively low, real 
risk-free rate (0.7 per cent), increases in the equity premium for the analysis that 
follows is achieved by increasing the market return rate, rather than by decreasing the 
already low risk-free rate. 
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Figure 4.6, below, shows that for a 1.5 per cent increase in the equity risk premium 
(from 8.5 per cent to 10 per cent), the expected share value falls to $2.98.  A 1.5 per 
cent change in the perceived equity risk premium during the global financial crisis is 
not an unreasonable assumption and could certainly explain the collapse in 
BrisConnections’ share price even in the absence of doubts over other parameters 
(such as inflation or traffic flows).  Just a small increase in the equity risk premium 
would mean that traffic and other forecasts have to be almost 100 per cent accurate 
for the share value to stay above $3. 
 
 
Figure 4.6 - Share Value vs Equity Risk Premium 
 
4.10.5  Operating Costs 
As discussed in the literature review, toll road projects tend to underestimate the 
operating costs associated with continuing maintenance, upgrades, and roadwork.  
The forecasting model contains a parameter to scale the base forecast operating cost.  
Figure 4.7, below, shows the sensitivity of the share value forecast to this operating 
cost parameter.  A value of ‘.9’ means that the annual operating costs used in the 
model are 90 per cent of their forecast value in the first year of operation.  The 
model then scales this figure up each year in accordance with inflation. 
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Figure 4.7 - Share Value vs Operating Costs 
 
Again, as expected, inaccuracies in the projected operating costs decrease the value 
of the project.  The relationship is linear, and shows that the project is not as 
sensitive to operating cost forecasts as it is to other variables.  Even though 
operating costs may not have as significant effect on the share value as other factors 
(such as the traffic forecast discount rate), when taken into account with other 
parameter variations it could still help to explain why investors lost confidence in the 
value of BrisConnections’ shares.  
 
4.10.6  The Return to Debt 
An increase in the expected cost of debt financing may also explain the falling share 
value of the project.  The project entails a high amount of long-term debt and the 
proposed interest-only repayment structure means that changes in the commercial 
debt rate will affect the share value.  Using an equity premium of 8.5 per cent, figure 
4.8, below, shows the effects of increases in the cost of debt (assuming no traffic 
discount and an average inflation rate of 2.5 per cent). 
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Figure 4.8 - Share Value vs Cost of Debt Finance 
 
Again, the graph shows that the project is fairly sensitive to relatively small increases 
in the cost of finance.  A 1 per cent increase in the cost of debt from 8.5 per cent to 
9.5 per cent causes a $1 drop in share value. 
 
4.10.7  Combining Shocks 
The analysis above has looked at each variable independently of any others.  Figure 
4.9 and 4.10, below, summarise the share value of the Airport Link project under a 
variety of contemporaneous changes in different variables.  The first shows the 
impact of different traffic discount rates, as well as different choices for the asset 
beta value, while the second looks at traffic discount rates and increases in the equity 
premium.  If the market felt that the project was more risky than the average 
transport sector project, then traffic discount rates will have a more significant effect 
on the share price.  Similarly, if the required equity premium increased at the same 
time that doubts surfaced about traffic forecasts, then the combination of these 
effects will drag the share price down even faster.  Both of the scenarios below 
continue to use the assumption that average inflation over the life of the project will 
be 2.5 per cent. 
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Figure 4.9 - Share Value Under Different Asset Beta Assumptions 
 
 
Figure 4.10 - Share Value with different Equity Beta assumptions 
 
These forecasts seem to indicate that the Airport Link project is highly sensitive to 
changes in traffic volume, as well as changes in the beta value and/or market rate 
used to value it.  Even with fairly modest values for the project’s beta and the equity 
risk premium, the share price falls significantly if traffic volumes fall by just 10 per 
cent.  If the analysis in the section on optimism risk outlined above is correct, and it 
is common for observed traffic volumes to be as little as 70 per cent of their forecast 
value then the analysis above shows that investors would rapidly re-value their 
investment once the board announced that it would not pay a substantial dividend 
on partly paid securities.  In short, it would appear that the shares were floated at a 
price very close to their net present value under generous assumptions and that the 
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most likely explanations for the subsequent collapse was either doubt about the 
accuracy of the traffic forecasts or an increase the risk premium investors required of 
their capital. 
 
4.11  Price Corrections 
Assuming that the traffic volumes were incorrectly specified, the only way for 
BrisConnections to increase the value of its stock would be to increase the tolls 
levied upon motorists.  This is, of course, barred by the concession agreement with 
the State Government, but examining the project’s sensitivity to changes in toll price 
should help in determining the value of flexibility in setting toll prices, something 
which would be possible if the project was entirely financed by the public sector.  
The PDS sets out the predicted savings in travel time for each of the tunnel sections.  
These are replicated in table 4.9, below. 
 
Table 4.9 - Expected Travel Time Savings (BrisConnections, 2008 : 44) 
Tunnel section 
Expected travel 
times on 
competing routes 
Expected travel 
time on Airport 
Link 
Expected 
maximum travel 
savings 
1 - Bowen Hills to 
Kedron 22-26 10 12-16 
2 - Bowen Hills to 
Toombul 25-29 12 13-17 
3 - Kedron to 
Toombul 14-17 5 9-12 
 
Therefore, under the most generous assumptions motorists will save between 20 and 
28 per cent of an hour travelling on Airport Link compared to travelling on an 
alternative route. 
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It is difficult to determine a monetary value that accurately represents the time saved 
by users of toll roads.  Different classes of users will value time differently depending 
on the reason for the journey taken, the time of day, and whether or not they are 
getting paid for the trip.  Some studies even show that commuters enjoy a certain 
amount of travel each day, implying that for some journeys at least, commuters 
would not pay for a shortened journey time (Mokhtarian, 2005).  Nevertheless, many 
studies have been conducted attempting to determine the value of travel time with 
varying results.  A 2004 report conducted for the Australian Transport Research 
Forum compiled estimates of travel-time values for travel within Brisbane.  These are 
presented in table 4.10, below, in 2003 Australian dollars per person hour.  
 
Table 4.10 - Estimated Value of Travel Time in Brisbane, Australia (Douglas, 2003) 
Short journey (< 30 mins) Medium journey (30-45 Minutes) 
Peak Off-Peak Peak Off-Peak 
Mode 
of 
travel CBD Non CBD CBD 
Non 
CBD CBD 
Non 
CBD CBD 
Non 
CBD 
Bus 9.20 7.70 7.50 5.90 9.20 8.70 7.60 7.50 
Rail 9.30 6.90 6.90 6.00 8.80 7.70 7.90 6.70 
Ferry 10.70 - 8.30 - - - - - 
Car 10.60 9.00 8.30 7.10 10.10 8.00 9.00 6.40 
 
Other studies indicate that the appropriate value for travel time should be measured 
against the prevailing average wage.  Litman (2007) reports that an adult passenger’s 
time is valued at 30 and 70 per cent of the average wage, depending on the level of 
congestion involved.  An adult driver’s time is valued at between 50 and 100 per cent 
of the average wage.  Similar figures are reported by the US Transportation Research 
Board (2002). 
 
Ultimately it is difficult to rely upon any of these figures with certainty, as none of 
these studies examined roadways that are primarily dedicated to servicing airports.  
One can imagine that road users would be willing to pay more for time savings when 
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attempting to reach a departing plane on time than they would if they were simply 
turning up for work.  Implicitly, however, the government-set tolls assume that 
people value their time at least as much as the tolls.  Based on the forecast time-savings 
outlined above, an implicit value for travel-time can be calculated: 
 
Table 4.11 - Value of Travel Time Savings, 2006 Australian Dollars 
Tunnel Section Toll 
Expected 
Maximum 
Travel savings 
Implicit 
Minimum Hourly 
Value of Travel 
Time 
Cars:  $4.00 $15 
LCV:  $6.00 $22.5 1 - Bowen Hills to Kedron 
HCV:  $10.60 
16 mins 
$39.75 
Cars:  $4.00 $14.12 
LCV:  $6.00 $21.18 2 - Bowen Hills to Toombul 
HCV:  $10.60 
17 mins 
$37.41 
Cars:  $3.00 $15 
LCV:  $4.50 $22.5 3 - Kedron to Toombul 
HCV:  $7.95 
12 mins 
$39.75 
 
It can be seen that the tolls appear to have been set with a consistent time-value in 
mind.  Indeed, the implicit hourly value of saved time is identical for all vehicles 
using sections 1 and 3, and only mildly different for section 2.  It can also be seen 
that the minimum time-values required of car users are somewhat higher than the 
studies outlined earlier suggest.  Even taking into account inflation since 2003, the 
values suggested by Douglas are lower than those implied by the tolls.  A full 
explanation of this differential is beyond the scope of this thesis, however it should 
be mentioned that many of the studies discussed allow for significant increases in 
time-value for travel along congested routes.  Because the Airport Link project was 
constructed in response to congestion concerns along existing routes, it could be 
argued that the implicit values are plausible once the costs of congestion are taken 
into account. 
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Returning to the original question, if some of the forecasts in the PDS are not met, 
how high would tolls have to rise in order for investors to recover their initial $3 
investment?  The first point that should be made is that car and motorcycle users will 
bear the brunt of any increased tolls.  First, these users make up the bulk of predicted 
traffic flows on the Airport Link project (approximately 80 per cent).  Even very 
large increases in the tolls for light commercial vehicles and heavy commercial 
vehicles make very small differences to the overall share value of the project.  Figure 
4.11, below, shows the forecast share value of the project for different increases in 
each type of toll. 
 
 
Figure 4.11 - Share Value vs Toll Increases (Elasticities Excluded) 
 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the price elasticity of demand for car users 
can reasonably be expected to be lower than the price elasticity of demand for 
commercial vehicles.  Again, this assumption can be made for two reasons.  First, car 
and bike users are less likely to be able to choose their travel time, or to be flexible 
with their travel time should the prevailing congestion conditions appear 
unfavourable.  Commuters and those catching flights will find it much more difficult 
to find an alternative route should they be travelling at peak-hour and need to reach 
the airport by a specified time.  Commercial vehicles, on the other hand, are less 
restricted by travel times.  Operators may organise their affairs so that travel on these 
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routes is timed for less congested periods, making Airport Link a less attractive 
alternative.  Second, it could be argued (though perhaps less convincingly in this 
case) that commercial vehicles are more likely to be knowledgeable of alternative 
routes.  Standard ‘learning by doing’ models would suggest that the more frequently a 
certain route is travelled the more likely the operators are to find a suitable alternative 
route. 
 
Estimating a suitable figure for the price-elasticity of traffic demand is difficult for a 
number of reasons.  There are relatively few privatised toll roads around the world 
and the site-specific nature of many of them means it is difficult to gather results that 
are easily transferable to other situations (Matas, 2003 : 4).  There is also relatively 
little information on how elasticities change between different users (commercial 
vehicles versus private vehicles).  Nevertheless, most estimates put the price elasticity 
of demand for toll roads at somewhere between -0.3 and -0.5 (Matas, 2003 : 4). 
 
Assuming that the elasticity for cars is -0.3 and that the elasticity for commercial 
vehicles is relatively higher at -0.5, how much would tolls have to rise by in order to 
recoup a $3 net present value if traffic volumes were only 70 per cent of their 
predicted totals?  Figure 4.12, below, plots share price against toll increase factors 
under fairly generous valuation assumptions (2.5 per cent average inflation, an 8.5 
per cent risk premium and an asset beta of 0.5), except that the traffic forecasts 
calculated in Appendices IV and V have been modified to take into account the 
elasticities discussed above.  It is clear from the graph that the maximum recoverable 
share price requires significant increases in tolls, particularly for cars and motorbikes.  
The tolls can be maximised individually because the model assumes that the traffic 
volumes of each vehicle class is independent of the others.  Realistically, this 
assumption could be challenged on the ground that more or less of some types of 
vehicles (particularly heavy commercial vehicles) could affect the desirability of using 
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the road for other types of vehicles (such as cars).  Any analysis of this sort is not 
taken into account here. 
 
The model predicts that the maximum recoverable share price is $3.06, at a 120 per 
cent increase in the toll for cars and a 40 per cent increase in the tolls for light and 
heavy commercial vehicles.   
 
 
Figure 4.12 - Share Value vs Toll Price Increases (Elasticities Included) 
 
If, however, decreased traffic flows are accompanied by an increased equity premium 
(10 per cent), then it becomes apparent that the net present value per share can never 
reach $3, regardless of how high tolls are raised.  Because the falls in demand will 
more than offset the increased revenue streams, the maximum recoverable share 
price is only $2.39.  This modelling implies that if any of the project’s traffic-flow 
vulnerabilities materialise, investors will realise that there is no way for them to 
retrieve value from their investment.  Even if BrisConnections was allowed to 
increase toll prices beyond Brisbane CPI (perhaps through an alteration of the 
concession agreement with the government) there would still be no way to recoup 
the value of the project for investors.  This is shown in figure 4.13, below. 
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Figure 4.13 - Share Value vs Toll Price Increases 
 
Because BrisConnections will have significant monopoly power once it owns and 
operates the Airport Link tunnel there is reason to believe it may use its incumbency 
to persuade the government to alter the concession agreement.  This has happened 
before, such as with the M5 motorway in Sydney (McCarthy, 2009).  The analysis 
above shows that the expected price rises would be substantial if this was allowed to 
occur. 
 
4.12  Chapter Summary 
This chapter has done three things.  First, it has valued the Airport Link project and 
found that under the assumptions outlined in the PDS, the shares have a relatively 
high net present value; certainly high enough to make the investment appear 
attractive to prospective investors.  Second, it has modelled the sensitivity of the 
share price to changes in investors’ assumptions about forecast parameters, showing 
that the project is highly sensitive to even small changes in these assumptions.  
Finally, it has offered some insights into the price corrections that would be required 
by BrisConnections in order to restore the share value to an appropriate level should 
any of the forecasts in the PDS appear incorrect. 
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Part 5 - The Share Price Collapse 
5.1  Introduction 
Now that the project has been valued and its sensitivity to changes in investors’ 
assumptions have been modelled, an attempt will be made to combine this 
information with what is publicly known about the project in order to produce a 
plausible explanation for the collapse in BrisConnections’ share price.  Broadly, the 
hypothesised explanation is that uncertainty over traffic forecasts lead investors to 
the realisation that their shares were not worth the $3 purchase price, leading many 
to divest their holdings.  The cheaper share price induced smaller investors to 
purchase shares in order to make short-term capital gains, or gains out of the 
proposed dividends declared by the board, unaware of the future liability to pay a 
further $2 per share.  At this point, investors with significant assets (and who would 
be susceptible to an order to pay the remaining $2 liability) found the investment 
even less attractive, as a shortfall in equity financing from delinquent investors would 
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need to be made up with increased debt financing, eating into the revenue used to 
pay the dividends owed to shareholders. 
 
These issues will all be discussed in more detail below, starting with a more in-depth 
look at the BrisConnections financing structure and the story surrounding the initial 
public offering. 
 
5.2  A Brief History of BrisConnections 
In 2005 the Queensland Government passed the South East Queensland Regional 
Plan (SEQRP) and subsequently released the South East Queensland Infrastructure 
Plan and Program (SEQIPP).  The purpose of these documents was to create 
infrastructure in order to support the rapid population growth of Brisbane and the 
South East Queensland region.  Four years into the program, $16.4 billion has been 
invested in 250 projects (Queensland Government, 2009b : 1).  While Airport Link is 
one of these projects, it also forms part of the TransApex project, a 2004 initiative by 
the Brisbane City Council financed partly by the Federal Department of Transport 
and Regional Services that aims to develop programs to alleviate the high levels of 
congestion on Brisbane’s traffic networks.  As well as the Airport Link, TransApex 
includes: 
• the North-South Bypass Tunnel (or ‘Clem7’ tunnel) connecting 
Kangaroo Point to Bowen Hills, 
• the Hale Street Link connecting Milton and West End, 
• the Northern Link connecting the Western Freeway at Toowong to the 
Inner City Bypass, and 
• the East-West Link connecting the Pacific Motorway at Buranda to the 
Western Freeway at Toowong (TransApex, 2005 : ix). 
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In 2005 a prefeasibility study of the TransApex project was completed and in 
February 2007 expressions of interest for the construction of the Airport Link 
project were called for.  Three consortiums were short listed by the government: 
• BrisConnections (Macquarie Capital Group providing the majority of 
financing, Thiess and John Holland providing construction services) 
• North Connect (Baulderstone Hornibrook, Abigroup, Bilfinger Berger 
Civil and Babcock & Brown), and 
• Northern Motorway (Leighton Contractors for construction and ABN 
AMRO Australia providing finance). 
 
On 19 May 2008 the Queensland Government announced BrisConnections as the 
winning bidder and the concession agreement was signed on 2 June 2008.  Financial 
close was subsequently achieved on 30 July 2008 along with the initial public 
offering.  In progressing the project to this stage there were many reports of 
underhanded dealings and conflicts of interest.  First, the fee structure for Macquarie 
Capital meant that they would be paid a lump-sum of $110 million up front (West, 
2008).  Second, Queensland’s Premier, Anna Bligh, had accepted a free holiday in 
Sydney at the mansion of Thiess director Ros Kelly in January 2008 (Lion, 2008).  
Finally, success fees of approximately $500 000 were paid to former labour 
politicians Terry Mackenroth and Con Sciacca after BrisConnections won the 
Airport Link bid (Wardill, 2009). 
 
After one day of trading the stocks fell by 60 per cent and very shortly afterward they 
began trading at a tenth of a cent per share, the lowest allowable amount under the 
ASX trading rules.  At the time the $500 000 success fees were paid to the two 
former ministers, the entire market capitalisation of the company was just $400 000.  
Shortly after this collapse in share price, two large institutional investors, Macquarie 
Capital and the Queensland Investment Corporation (a state-owned company) sold 
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down their share holdings and retail investors began to buy the stock on the promise 
of a 5.95 cent per share distribution. 
 
In October the directors of BrisConnections decided to cut the distribution to just 
0.05 cents per share, and at this point, the partly-paid stocks represented a $2 liability.  
The day after the announcement over 112 million shares traded hands, representing 
over a quarter of the issued stock in the company (Saulwick, 2008). 
 
In April 2009, Nicholas Bolton acquired a 20 per cent holding in BrisConnections 
(largely in off-market transactions) through his company, Australian Style 
Investments, and threatened to have the company wound up at a shareholder 
meeting called under the Corporations Act 2003.  Many investors supported the 
winding up as a way to avoid paying the remaining $2 outstanding on their shares.  
Ultimately, however, Mr Bolton sold the voting rights attached to the shares to 
Leighton (one of the primary contractors responsible for construction of the Airport 
Link) for $4.5 million.  Mr Bolton claims he is protected against making the $77 
million payment on his shareholding by a guarantee he made with a friend of his 
father (Main, 2009). 
 
In May 2009, 70 per cent of the shareholders in the project defaulted on their $1 
payment (Gluyas, 2009).  Under the share agreement these stocks were offered at a 
public auction with a reserve price of $1.  This value was over twice its market value 
at the time and unsurprisingly, the auction did not attract any buyers (Gluyas, 2009).  
According to the agreement with BrisConnections’ underwriters, BrisConnections 
had six months from May to use its ‘best endeavours’ to collect the outstanding 
debts from investors.  This endeavour was made more difficult by the fact that many 
investors, in an attempt to avoid liability, had transferred their shares to fictitious 
offshore entities such as ‘Bud Gerigar’ and ‘Humphrey B Bear’ (Hawthorne, 2009). 
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Nevertheless, BrisConnections has pursued its debt-collection agenda aggressively 
and it is currently pursuing 64 unit-holders through the courts (Grant-Taylor, 2009).  
While the underwriters agreed to buy out those investors owning less than 55 000 
units, many unit-holders have been forced to sell significant assets in order to meet 
their payment obligations.  Others are awaiting the results of a class action which has 
begun in the Victorian Supreme Court before Justice Robson.  Ultimately, much of 
the liability for the stocks will depend on the outcome of this judicial decision. 
 
5.3  Impact of the Financing Plan 
The sudden collapse in share price can in part be explained by the divestiture of 
shares by large corporations.  This thesis has shown that the most likely reason for 
this was a perception that the traffic forecasts upon which the predicted revenue 
flows were based were far too optimistic.  But surely, the mere fact that a traffic 
forecast is inaccurate does not explain the implicit negative equity in the shares? 
 
At this point, the structure of the investment plan becomes relevant.  The fact that 
the shares were ‘partly paid’ meant that they became less attractive to investors of 
means (who would have been able to pay the remaining instalments), and more 
attractive to ‘investors of straw’, who could bank on the fact that, should they default 
on their loans, BrisConnections would not be able to recover all of the debt owed to 
them.  This becomes a self-propagating cycle, and the larger investors will be even 
keener to divest their stock once they see smaller retail investors buying ‘penny 
dreadfuls’ in the hope of making large capital gains off small price fluctuations. 
 
Although the substantive portions of the equity finance were underwritten (both the 
share contributions from the initial float and the DRP), it is unclear on what terms 
the underwriting has taken place or exactly what percentage of the equity 
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contributions are guaranteed.  It is reasonable to assume, then, that if significant 
portions of the equity finance fail, they will need to be replaced by debt financing.  
The sensitivity of the project to increased debt finance is modelled below, on the 
assumption of perfect traffic forecasts and an equity premium of 8.5 per cent. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 - Average Share Value vs Percentage of Debt Finance 
 
Given the high level of default on the issued shares, the original decrease in value 
from the implied revaluing of the traffic forecasts would have been magnified by any 
expected increase in debt financing required to keep the project afloat. 
 
5.4  Reasons for Traffic Forecast Doubts 
Arup has kept the details of its traffic modelling process secret and it is unlikely that 
they will be revealed anytime soon.  Nevertheless, it is possible to look at recent 
trends regarding traffic phenomena in Brisbane, as well as theory on competitive 
tending processes to offer some logical reasons as to why significant doubt may have 
existed about the traffic forecasts provided by BrisConnections.  Particularly, the 
theory of the ‘Winner’s Curse’ may explain why, where a number of companies have 
provided tenders for a project, the winner may have overly optimistic traffic 
forecasts.  Other factors which may give rise to doubts about the traffic forecasts 
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include the expected increasing costs of private motoring and the increased 
patronage of Brisbane’s public transport network.   
 
The winner’s curse was first coined by three engineers in the context of allocating 
oil-drilling rights in the Atlantic.  Assuming that many oil companies are bidding for 
the same rights to mine a particular reservoir, and assuming that the right is worth 
the same amount to each party, then the inherent uncertainty associated with the ex 
ante quantity of oil in the reservoir will mean that the companies will put forward 
different bids for the mining rights.  Some companies will possess favourable 
estimates, and correspondingly offer a high bid.  Others will possess less favourable 
estimates and therefore offer lower bids. 
 
The crux of the winner’s curse is that the person who wins the bid is also the one 
most likely to have paid too much for it.  There are two ways in which the winner’s 
curse may manifest itself (Thaler, 1992 : 51).  First, the winning bid may exceed the 
value of the item being contested.  Alternatively, the true value of the item may be 
lower than that which was estimated by the auction participants.  If all participants 
are rational then the winner’s curse cannot, in theory, occur (Cox, 1984), however 
there is much empirical evidence to support the conclusion that in large auctions, 
there is significant deviation between the mean bid value and the highest bid which 
will ultimately win the auction (Bazerman, 1983). 
 
In terms of the Airport Link project (which was, as outlined earlier, opened up for a 
competitive tendering process), the fact that the toll price was fixed by the 
government meant that companies were competing for the same item of unknown 
value, namely, the future cash flow from all vehicular traffic using the proposed 
tunnel.  Given that this value is determined entirely by the traffic forecasts, 
competitors with inflated traffic forecasts would have found the offer more 
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appealing than those with smaller forecasts.  Further, tenders with generous traffic 
forecasts would have been able to make equity finance appear to be an appealing 
option.  This appears to be at the heart of the BrisConnections proposal.  Favourable 
traffic forecasts allowed BrisConnections’ managers to make increased equity 
funding viable, in turn allowing them to take a highly leveraged, long-term debt 
position and secure their fees with large, up-front payments.  Any collapse in 
confidence about the traffic forecasts would then undo the value of the entire 
project. 
 
A second factor that does not seem to have been covered by the PDS concerns the 
predicted increase in private motoring costs.  Primarily, this comes from two sources: 
first, increased costs relating to fossil fuels (both due to supply constraints and 
external cost increases to combat climate change) and second, increased costs 
associated with owning a car. 
 
As to the first, it is widely estimated that a global ‘peak oil’ event will occur within 
the next few decades (Deffeys, 2001).  The most recent oil shock has already fuelled 
trends towards fewer cars per family, increased public transport patronage, and 
smaller cars with higher mileage.  The proposed Emissions Trading Scheme will 
cover fuel and it is unlikely that any measure adopted to prevent climate change will 
make it cheaper to run a fossil-fuel powered car (Porteous, 2008).  The second 
source of increased motoring cost relates to population and real-estate pressures.  
Fast-growing cities like Brisbane will find that residential parking spaces and casual 
parking will come at increased premiums. 
 
There is nothing in Arup’s forecasts to say that either of these factors has been taken 
into account, however it would appear anomalous to exclude such significant events 
from explicit consideration in a toll project with such a sensitive financing plan. 
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Finally, changes in public transport usage may have adjusted investors’ expectations 
of future traffic flows.  As outlined earlier, BrisConnections has assumed constant 
and low growth in Brisbane’s public transport patronage.  However, these 
assumptions seem to be disproved by the Queensland Government’s own forecasts 
for public transport use.  In the 2009 annual South East Queensland Infrastructure 
Plan and Program document the government states that ‘[g]rowth in public transport 
usage across South East Queensland has soared almost 40 per cent since 2004’ 
(Queensland Government, 2009b : 24).  Figure 5.2, below, shows this trend clearly. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 - Forecast Public Transport Patronage (Queensland Government, 2009b) 
 
Although much of the traffic carried on Airport Link does not directly compete with 
public transport (the only mass-transit option is the privately-operated AirTrain), the 
section of the tunnel from Bowen Hills to Kedron will directly compete with bus and 
rail services.  Indirectly, increased public transport patronage will reduce traffic flows 
across Brisbane and alleviate congestion on alternative routes to the airport, again 
lowering expected traffic through the tolled roads.  The public transport figures used 
in the PDS are based on data up to 2004.  As can be seen from figure 5.2, growth 
until this point was relatively small.  There is no reason provided in the PDS for why 
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more recent data concerning public transport was not used, however it does make 
reference to the fact that Brisbane public transport patronage is lower than that in 
Sydney and Melbourne.  The PDS explains this as a boon for investors, however it 
could equally be argued that public transport usage in Brisbane simply lags behind 
Sydney and Melbourne.  Instead, patronage will likely increase to levels consistent 
with those cities over the next few decades, not stagnate.  The flow-on effects of this 
type of outcome on the project’s traffic volumes do not seem to have been taken 
into account by Arup in formulating their traffic forecasts. 
 
5.5  An Alternative Financial Structure 
Given these weaknesses with the BrisConnections model, and given the importance 
of infrastructure to continued economic growth, how else could the government 
have arranged this project?  This section of the thesis will examine an alternative, 
state-funded model where bonds are issued to fund the construction of the project. 
 
Simply put, the State Government could have issued bonds to raise the construction 
capital, tender out construction, and then use the revenues from the tolls collected to 
pay the coupons on the bonds.  Re-financing could be achieved by re-issuing bonds 
every few years.  The advantages of this method of finance seem numerous.  First, 
bonds are a common and well-understood means of raising capital.  The difficulties 
associated with ‘partly paid’ shares are largely avoided, especially in terms of retail 
investors purchasing shares without realising the attendant risks and liabilities.  The 
second main advantage involves the risk premium.  The nature of government bonds 
means that residual risk rests with the government.  Consequently, the ‘risk-free’ 
nature of bonds reduces the rate of return required to induce investment. 
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The valuation was conducted using the same methodology as that outlined in chapter 
4, except that the project was funded entirely by debt and the discount rate used was 
the ‘real bond rate’, calculated by subtracting an expected inflation rate of 2.5 per 
cent from the bond rate prevalent at the time of financial close.  The repayment 
structure, whereby interest is paid off until 2035 and the principle over the remaining 
18 years of the concession, was maintained. 
 
Assuming that the Government issues $4.8 billion worth of bonds with an 
annualised return of 6.53 per cent, representing the prevailing 10-year Australian 
Treasury government bond rate during mid-2008 (Wren, 2009), and assuming that 
actual traffic flows will be 70 per cent of their predicted values, the valuation model 
predicts that the Airport Link will have a positive net present value of about $279 
million dollars, or 6 per cent of the total outlay.  This result can be seen in the excel 
data reproduced in Appendix VII. 
 
This appears to confirm the hypothesis that the tolls are set by the Government at a 
rate sufficient to pay off debt at a relatively low rate of return.  This calculated net 
present value is, however, very sensitive to the bond rate chosen.  Even if the rate 
rises to just 6.7 per cent the model predicts a negative net present value.  This can be 
seen in figure 5.3, below. 
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Figure 5.3 - Net Present Value vs Bond Rate 
 
However unlike the current concession structure, which prevents BrisConnections 
from raising tolls, a public-funded option gives greater flexibility over toll pricing.  
Even assuming a relatively high bond rate of 7 per cent (the last time 10-year 
Australian Treasury bond rates were higher than 7 per cent for more than two 
consecutive months was in 1997), the model predicts that just a 10 per cent increase 
in motoring tolls will be more than sufficient to return the project to a positive net 
present value.  The publicly funded option allows tolls to more accurately reflect the 
cost of constructing the project and it also means that should adverse financial 
conditions develop, relatively small price changes in tolls should be sufficient to 
return the project to a solvent, financially stable state. 
 
5.6  Chapter Summary 
This chapter has considered many issues relevant to the construction of the Airport 
Link tunnel.  First, it has explained that the financial structure adopted by 
BrisConnections’ management left it particularly vulnerable to downward price-
spirals brought on by changing expectations of the equity risk premium, the project’s 
asset beta, or the traffic forecasts.  Second, it has provided a variety of plausible 
reasons for why large investors with some knowledge of the project’s vulnerabilities 
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may have found that the best course of action was to sell their securities at a loss, 
rather than be held liable for outstanding instalments.  Finally, it has considered an 
alternative financing and construction model which appears to offer significant 
benefits to the community compared to the existing structure. 
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Part 6 - Conclusion 
6.1  Summary of Findings 
So what has been learned?  In short, we have learned that the Airport Link project, 
as outlined in the PDS, was a very sensitive proposal.  An investor valuing the 
project would need to be entirely trusting of the company they are providing capital 
to in order to be assured of making a positive return.  Any investor with information 
to suggest that the information in the PDS is incorrect, or has become incorrect after 
financial close, will find the investment to be an unattractive option. 
 
The thesis has also shown that the private-financing structure lacks the flexibility of a 
publicly funded alternative.  The concession agreement prohibits price flexibility in 
any event, but even if flexibility were allowed, the price rises required to make the 
project attractive if adverse financial conditions develop are at best unreasonable, and 
at worst insufficient (due to demand elasticities) to recover investor contributions. 
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Finally, the thesis has shown that the financing structure involved in this project 
provides incentives for large-scale investors to sell once they see any cause for doubt 
about the assumptions underpinning the initial valuation.  In turn, this encourages 
poorer investors without the capacity to pay remaining instalments to enter, and this 
vicious cycle continues until the project becomes worthless. 
 
6.2  Mixing Public and Private Involvement 
Although this thesis has found significant problems with the private financing 
structure involved in the Airport Link project, there are, of course, many ways in 
which private involvement in the provision of infrastructure is beneficial.  The 
efficiency gains discussed in chapter 3 are one, while the effect on interest rates and a 
reduction in the ‘crowding out’ effect are another.  In short, this thesis does not go as 
far to say that there should never be any private involvement in public infrastructure 
provision, but it does suggest that several issues need to be given serious attention 
first. 
 
The ultimate test for how much private enterprise should be involved in public 
infrastructure provision ought to be based on whether the present value of net social 
benefits with private involvement exceeds the value without private involvement.  
Because this comparison often rests upon evaluating information that is either 
difficult to obtain or does not exist, some authors have proposed assessing the 
desirability for private involvement across a broad range of criteria.  Specifically, the 
following deserve careful consideration: 
• labour intensity versus capital intensity, (where the private sector is 
generally considered better at minimising the cost of labour and the 
equity premium suggests the public sector is better at undertaking capital-
intensive projects), 
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• internal risk versus external risk, (where private control is considered 
preferable if the returns to the project are highly contingent upon internal 
risk factors), 
• competitive markets versus monopoly, (where public ownership is 
considered preferable for monopolies), and 
• externalities or market failures, (where the presence of externalities 
requires government intervention, public ownership should be preferred).  
(Quiggin, 1996) 
 
Under almost all of these criteria it would seem that public financing would be a 
better option for public toll roads.  Construction under equity-backed PPPs is highly 
capital intensive and the risk of slumps in traffic forecasts due to financial downturns 
or increased motoring costs associated with peak oil events or carbon reduction 
schemes are certainly external risks to the toll road itself.  The inelastic demand for 
toll roads means they are a source of monopoly power, and the externalities 
associated with toll roads (such as reduced congestion on other roads and decreased 
travel times) mean that the public sector offers the flexibility in risk management that 
the private sector cannot.  This thesis has shown how the fixed-price system of the 
concession agreement reduces flexibility, while a government-led consortium would 
be able to change prices by relatively smaller amounts to correct for unfavourable 
economic conditions. 
 
It is hoped that in future these principles can be used as guideposts for policy makers 
and private enterprise alike to direct decision-making processes on projects of this 
type. 
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6.3  Areas for Further Research 
There are a number of areas of research that would clarify some of the issues raised 
in this thesis.  Perhaps most obviously, a solution to the equity premium puzzle 
would make it easier to value private enterprises that involve significant amounts of 
equity financing.  The current global financial crisis makes it difficult to evaluate the 
equity premium, and consequently, it becomes difficult to model investor preferences 
and behaviour.  Indeed, the volatility associated with market returns over the past 
twelve months means that many of the assumptions underpinning the valuation 
frameworks used in this thesis (and much of macroeconomic theory in general) can 
be called into question. 
 
Another area concerns information asymmetries between corporate managers and 
investors.  Particularly with information-sensitive project such as toll roads, the fact 
that traffic forecasts can be kept secret under ‘commercial-in-confidence’ rules means 
that investors are usually unable to perform individual valuations of the project.  
Consequently, large-scale investors are able to sell-out early and mitigate losses, while 
retail investors may unwittingly expose themselves to increased risk at a lower price. 
 
Finally, more research is needed into the expected consequence of selling partly-paid-
securities in an open market where little financial competence is required of market 
participants.  Many investors in BrisConnections claim to have known little about the 
continuing obligations to pay instalments on their stapled units.  While there were 
some safety-measures in place to prevent this type of argument, it certainly appears 
that many have made unwise investments given the pricing information made 
available to them. 
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6.4  Concluding Remarks 
It is difficult, in economic frameworks like those discussed above, to remember the 
human element involved in these problems.  Many investors in the Airport Link 
project have lost their entire life savings due to a financing structure that was, 
arguably, bound to fail from the beginning.  While the thesis has only examined one 
project, the story is not an isolated one: there are many examples of private toll roads 
and infrastructure projects that have collapsed with the eventual victims being ‘mum 
and dad’ investors with little or no financial competence. 
 
The benefits to society in such cases also appear minimal.  The residual risk in the 
case that private enterprise fails still lies with the tax payer, and the institutions that 
underwrite the project often collect up-front fees which are inflated for the ‘riskiness’ 
of the project, a riskiness which often only accrues as a result of the private sector’s 
involvement in the first place.  By involving private finance, a higher return is 
required, which in turn makes the project more sensitive to economic fluctuations 
and consequently increases the required rate of return (and associated cost) of the 
project.  This ‘upwards cost spiral’ means that the eventual value for equity in the 
project is unstable, and with poorly designed financial plans, the risk of failure is 
magnified considerably. 
 
It is hoped that this thesis has shed some light on these issues so as to prevent a 
repeat of the situation that BrisConnections, its investors, and the people of 
Queensland find themselves in. 
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Appendix I 
DERIVATION OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM (FROM MEHRA, 2008) 
 
 
The derivation starts with a single representative household, which orders its preferences
over consumption paths by:
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Appendix II 
PROJECT FINANCE - GLOBAL (YESCOMBE, 2007 :118) 
 
(US$ millions) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Americas       
Brazil 10 092 5 611 1 788 5 112 4 715 3 061 
Canada 3 015 622 505 538 1 575 2 488 
Chile 3 236 5 442 1 490 718 3 198 3 452 
Mexico 3 984 4 412 4 422 5 186 9 094 3 675 
USA 44 886 47 588 13 233 15 488 23 587 25 581 
       
Asia-Pacific       
Australia 5 099 4 459 8 948 6 511 13 129 9 745 
China 0 0 3 842 3 930 2 787 759 
India 129 114 1 016 122 1 187 3 123 
Japan 131 2 265 498 1 629 3 720 2 205 
Malaysia 0 1 709 2 368 1 983 3 233 2 935 
South Korea 718  1 415 1 141 2 732 6 341 4 575 
Taiwan 0 222 613 76 4 968 216 
Thailand 1 718 536 1 436 1 496 2 010 1 444 
       
Europe       
France 49 360 721 136 201 1 997 
Germany 12 806 4 978 401 492 705 2 006 
Hungary 500 125 226 596 1 640 1 413 
Italy 5 602 13 787 7 952 12 406 3 795 9 824 
Netherlands 300 1 176 1 527 769 92 1 159 
Portugal 1 537 1 643 1 249 870 2 606 2 995 
Spain 567 6 371 1 410 8 167 5 602 16 147 
UK 13 988 6 329 10 579 14 485 17 692 21 594 
       
Middle East & Africa       
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 1 600 780 
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 60 1 100 75 
Bahrain 0 0 255 1 350 1 925 153 
Egypt 0 651 0 950 1 853 2 183 
Oman 513 2 030 677 908 1 608 5 671 
Qatar 0 1 132 300 1 295 6 778 16 326 
Saudi Arabia 852 2 176 280 820 3 726 2 466 
UAE 1 096 1 638 0 1 855 1 933 2 367 
Nigeria 0 0 1 000 879 1 650 1 702 
South Africa 127 718 333 318 261 600 
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Appendix III 
MAP OF THE AIRPORT LINK PROJECT (BRISCONNECTIONS, 2008) 
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Appendix IV 
FORECAST TRAFFIC FLOWS - CONTINUOUS GROWTH POST 2031 - SECTION 1 
Year Motorcycle Car LCV HCV 
2012 897 81289 6734 1677 
2013 916 82893 6867 1817 
2014 935 84529 7002 1968 
2015 955 86198 7140 2132 
2016 975 87899 7281 2309 
2017 1,017 91578 7586 2535 
2018 1,061 95412 7903 2783 
2019 1,107 99405 8234 3055 
2020 1,156 103566 8579 3354 
2021 1,206 107901 8938 3683 
2022 1,258 112418 9312 4043 
2023 1,289 114949 9522 4344 
2024 1,320 117537 9736 4666 
2025 1,352 120183 9956 5013 
2026 1,385 122889 10180 5386 
2027 1,388 123146 10201 5395 
2028 1,391 123404 10223 5403 
2029 1,393 123663 10244 5412 
2030 1,396 123922 10266 5420 
2031 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2032 1,402 124441 10309 5438 
2033 1,405 124702 10330 5446 
2034 1,407 124963 10352 5455 
2035 1,410 125224 10373 5464 
2036 1,413 125487 10395 5472 
2037 1,416 125749 10417 5481 
2038 1,419 126013 10439 5490 
2039 1,422 126277 10461 5499 
2040 1,425 126541 10482 5507 
2041 1,427 126806 10504 5516 
2042 1,430 127071 10526 5525 
2043 1,433 127337 10548 5534 
2044 1,436 127604 10570 5542 
2045 1,439 127871 10593 5551 
2046 1,442 128139 10615 5560 
2047 1,445 128407 10637 5569 
2048 1,448 128676 10659 5578 
2049 1,451 128946 10682 5587 
2050 1,454 129216 10704 5596 
2051 1,456 129486 10726 5604 
2052 1,459 129757 10749 5613 
2053 1,462 130029 10771 5622 
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APPENDIX IV CONTINUED 
FORECAST TRAFFIC FLOWS - CONTINUOUS GROWTH POST 2031 - SECTION 2 
Year Motorcycle Car LCV HCV 
2012 671 60821 5038 1223 
2013 700 63277 5242 1437 
2014 730 65832 5453 1689 
2015 762 68490 5674 1985 
2016 795 71255 5903 2333 
2017 800 71383 5914 2587 
2018 804 71512 5924 2869 
2019 809 71640 5935 3182 
2020 814 71769 5946 3529 
2021 818 71899 5956 3913 
2022 823 72028 5967 4340 
2023 854 74632 6183 4627 
2024 887 77330 6406 4933 
2025 920 80126 6637 5259 
2026 955 83023 6877 5607 
2027 964 83734 6936 5736 
2028 973 84452 6995 5869 
2029 982 85176 7055 6004 
2030 992 85906 7116 6142 
2031 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2032 1,010 87385 7239 6429 
2033 1,020 88133 7301 6577 
2034 1,030 88889 7363 6729 
2035 1,039 89650 7426 6884 
2036 1,049 90419 7490 7043 
2037 1,059 91194 7554 7205 
2038 1,069 91975 7619 7371 
2039 1,079 92763 7684 7541 
2040 1,089 93558 7750 7715 
2041 1,100 94360 7817 7893 
2042 1,110 95169 7884 8075 
2043 1,121 95984 7951 8261 
2044 1,131 96807 8020 8452 
2045 1,142 97637 8088 8647 
2046 1,153 98473 8158 8846 
2047 1,164 99317 8228 9050 
2048 1,175 100168 8298 9259 
2049 1,186 101027 8370 9472 
2050 1,197 101893 8441 9691 
2051 1,208 102766 8514 9914 
2052 1,220 103646 8587 10143 
2053 1,231 104535 8660 10377 
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APPENDIX IV CONTINUED 
FORECAST TRAFFIC FLOWS - CONTINUOUS GROWTH POST 2031 - SECTION 3 
Year Motorcycle Car LCV HCV 
2012 350 31542 2613 809 
2013 366 32958 2730 894 
2014 383 34438 2853 987 
2015 401 35984 2981 1091 
2016 419 37600 3115 1205 
2017 439 39223 3249 1378 
2018 459 40916 3390 1575 
2019 481 42682 3536 1800 
2020 504 44525 3689 2058 
2021 527 46447 3848 2353 
2022 552 48452 4014 2690 
2023 551 48344 4005 2699 
2024 549 48236 3996 2708 
2025 548 48128 3987 2717 
2026 547 48021 3978 2726 
2027 532 46626 3862 2758 
2028 518 45271 3750 2790 
2029 504 43955 3641 2823 
2030 491 42678 3536 2856 
2031 478 41438 3433 2889 
2032 465 40234 3333 2923 
2033 453 39065 3237 2957 
2034 441 37930 3143 2991 
2035 429 36828 3051 3026 
2036 418 35757 2963 3062 
2037 407 34718 2877 3098 
2038 396 33710 2793 3134 
2039 385 32730 2712 3170 
2040 375 31779 2633 3207 
2041 365 30856 2557 3245 
2042 355 29959 2483 3283 
2043 346 29088 2410 3321 
2044 337 28243 2340 3360 
2045 328 27423 2272 3399 
2046 319 26626 2206 3439 
2047 310 25852 2142 3479 
2048 302 25101 2080 3520 
2049 294 24371 2020 3561 
2050 286 23663 1961 3602 
2051 279 22976 1904 3644 
2052 271 22308 1849 3687 
2053 264 21660 1795 3730 
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Appendix V 
FORECAST TRAFFIC FLOWS - FIXED GROWTH POST 2031 - SECTION 1 
Year Motorcycle Car LCV HCV 
2012 897 81289 6734 1677 
2013 916 82893 6867 1817 
2014 935 84529 7002 1968 
2015 955 86198 7140 2132 
2016 975 87899 7281 2309 
2017 1,017 91578 7586 2535 
2018 1,061 95412 7903 2783 
2019 1,107 99405 8234 3055 
2020 1,156 103566 8579 3354 
2021 1,206 107901 8938 3683 
2022 1,258 112418 9312 4043 
2023 1,289 114949 9522 4344 
2024 1,320 117537 9736 4666 
2025 1,352 120183 9956 5013 
2026 1,385 122889 10180 5386 
2027 1,388 123146 10201 5395 
2028 1,391 123404 10223 5403 
2029 1,393 123663 10244 5412 
2030 1,396 123922 10266 5420 
2031 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2032 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2033 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2034 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2035 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2036 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2037 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2038 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2039 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2040 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2041 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2042 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2043 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2044 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2045 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2046 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2047 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2048 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2049 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2050 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2051 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2052 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
2053 1,399 124181 10287 5429 
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APPENDIX V CONTINUED 
FORECAST TRAFFIC FLOWS - CONTINUOUS GROWTH POST 2031 - SECTION 2 
Year Motorcycle Car LCV HCV 
2012 671 60821 5038 1223 
2013 700 63277 5242 1437 
2014 730 65832 5453 1689 
2015 762 68490 5674 1985 
2016 795 71255 5903 2333 
2017 800 71383 5914 2587 
2018 804 71512 5924 2869 
2019 809 71640 5935 3182 
2020 814 71769 5946 3529 
2021 818 71899 5956 3913 
2022 823 72028 5967 4340 
2023 854 74632 6183 4627 
2024 887 77330 6406 4933 
2025 920 80126 6637 5259 
2026 955 83023 6877 5607 
2027 964 83734 6936 5736 
2028 973 84452 6995 5869 
2029 982 85176 7055 6004 
2030 992 85906 7116 6142 
2031 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2032 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2033 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2034 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2035 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2036 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2037 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2038 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2039 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2040 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2041 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2042 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2043 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2044 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2045 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2046 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2047 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2048 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2049 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2050 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2051 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2052 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
2053 1,001 86642 7177 6284 
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APPENDIX V CONTINUED 
FORECAST TRAFFIC FLOWS - CONTINUOUS GROWTH POST 2031 - SECTION 3 
Year Motorcycle Car LCV HCV 
2012 350 31542 2613 809 
2013 366 32958 2730 894 
2014 383 34438 2853 987 
2015 401 35984 2981 1091 
2016 419 37600 3115 1205 
2017 439 39223 3249 1378 
2018 459 40916 3390 1575 
2019 481 42682 3536 1800 
2020 504 44525 3689 2058 
2021 527 46447 3848 2353 
2022 552 48452 4014 2690 
2023 551 48344 4005 2699 
2024 549 48236 3996 2708 
2025 548 48128 3987 2717 
2026 547 48021 3978 2726 
2027 532 46626 3862 2758 
2028 518 45271 3750 2790 
2029 504 43955 3641 2823 
2030 491 42678 3536 2856 
2031 478 41438 3433 2889 
2032 478 41438 3433 2889 
2033 478 41438 3433 2889 
2034 478 41438 3433 2889 
2035 478 41438 3433 2889 
2036 478 41438 3433 2889 
2037 478 41438 3433 2889 
2038 478 41438 3433 2889 
2039 478 41438 3433 2889 
2040 478 41438 3433 2889 
2041 478 41438 3433 2889 
2042 478 41438 3433 2889 
2043 478 41438 3433 2889 
2044 478 41438 3433 2889 
2045 478 41438 3433 2889 
2046 478 41438 3433 2889 
2047 478 41438 3433 2889 
2048 478 41438 3433 2889 
2049 478 41438 3433 2889 
2050 478 41438 3433 2889 
2051 478 41438 3433 2889 
2052 478 41438 3433 2889 
2053 478 41438 3433 2889 
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Appendix VI 
MODEL INPUT/OUTPUT - PRIVATE FINANCING 
  
INPUTS:  
Traffic Discount Factor (enter 0 to 1) 0 
Ramp-up discount (enter 0 to 1) - First 6 Months 0.2 
Ramp-up discount (enter 0 to 1) - Second 6 Months 0.05 
Inflation Rate (Percentage - ie, 2.5% = 2.5)  
2008-2013 3.5 
2014-2018 3.3 
2019-2028 3 
2029-2053 2.95 
Book Value of Project = Equity + Debt + State Contribution (billions)  4.889  
Equity (billions)  1.787  
Debt (billions  3.055  
Real Risk Free Rate (Percentage) 0.7 
Real Market Return (Percentage) 9.2 
Corporate Tax Rate (Percentage) 30 
Asset Beta 0.5 
Return on Debt (Percentage) 8.7 
Toll Increase Factor  
Cars + Bikes 1 
LCV 1 
HCV 1 
Toll Price Elasticities  
Elasticity Cars + Bikes -0.3 
Elasticity LCV -0.5 
Elasticity HCV -0.5 
Operating Cost Increases 1 
Number of Shares  640,060,585  
  
  
OUTPUTS:  
Equity Beta 1.37 
Return on Equity 12.33 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (Discount Rate) 7.22 
NPV - Continuous Growth Past 2031  $3,297,942,362.22  
NPV - Assume Capacity at 2031  $3,453,831,214.66  
  
Share Value - Continuous Growth Past 2031  $5.15  
Share Value - Assume Capacity at 2031  $5.40  
  
AVERAGE SHARE VALUE  $5.27  
APPENDICES 
118 
Appendix VII 
MODEL INPUT/OUTPUT - GOVERNMENT FINANCING 
INPUTS:  
Traffic Discount Factor (enter 0 to 1) 0.3 
Ramp-up discount (enter 0 to 1) - First 6 Months 0.2 
Ramp-up discount (enter 0 to 1) - Second 6 Months 0.05 
Inflation Rate (Percentage - ie, 2.5% = 2.5)  
2008-2013 2.5 
2014-2018 2.5 
2019-2028 2.5 
2029-2053 2.5 
Book Value of Project = Equity + Debt (billions)  4.889  
Equity (billions)  -  
Debt (billions  4.889  
Risk Free Rate (Percentage) 0.7 
Market Return (Percentage) 9.2 
Corporate Tax Rate (Percentage) 30 
Asset Beta 0.5 
Return on Debt (Percentage) 6.53 
Toll Increase Factor  
Cars + Bikes 1 
LCV 1 
HCV 1 
Toll Price Elasticities  
Elasticity Cars + Bikes -0.3 
Elasticity LCV -0.5 
Elasticity HCV -0.5 
Operating Cost Increases 1 
Number of Shares  -  
  
  
OUTPUTS:  
Equity Beta - 
Return on Equity - 
Discount Rate (%) 4.03 
NPV - Continuous Growth Past 2031  $340,702,446.11  
NPV - Assume Capacity at 2031  $216,794,776.27  
  
AVERAGE NPV  $278,748,611.19  
  
 
